The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable where the relationship between the parties is governed by a written contract that provides for the consequences of breach of contract and the promisee has not suffered any detriment.

1. THE doctrine of Promissory estoppel being a doctrine of equity is a rule evolved and adopted by the law courts to prevent arbitrariness and consequent violation of Article 14 and to ensure fairness in governmental, action. This Court in Surendra Prasad Mishra vs. O.N.G.C. (AIR 1987 Calcutta) laid emphasis that as a rule of equity and good conscience, the doctrine of promissory estoppel gives rise to an equity which the law Court will recognize even though, such a situation not constitute a legally enforceable cause of action. It is to be noted that Garth CJ, in an old Calcutta decision Ganges Manufacturing Co. (1880) ILR 5, Calcutta 669, also sounded a similar note as early as 1880 and one finds an echo of the same note in all subsequent decisions.

2. IN order, however, to appreciate this equitable doctrine one needs to analyse the doctrine and following ingredients of the doctrine clearly emerge on such an analysis:

a) A promise is made intending to create legal relations.

b) The said promise, to the knowledge of the promisor, was going to be acted upon by the promisee.

c) The said promise was in fact acted upon by the promisee by an alteration of position.

d) As a result of such alteration of position, the promisee has suffered a detriment. In such a situation, the counts have held that the promise must be honoured. In other words the promisor is estopped from going back upon his promise.

Law Courts, however, in the process of development of this doctrine have gone to the extent of holding that even without any proof of detriment, this doctrine is applicable in some cases. Lord Denning, in an article in modern Law Review (15, Modern Law Review Volume I, page 5) pointed out, with characteristic lucidity, the situations where this doctrine is attracted even without any proof of detriment. Lord Denning stated:

"the difference may lie in the necessity of showing 'detriment' where one party deliberately promises to waive, modify or discharge his strict legal rights, intending the other party to act on the faith of the promise, and the other party actually does act on it, then it is contrary, not only to equity but also to good faith, to allow the promisor to go back on his promise. It should not be necessary for the other party to show that he acted to his detriment in reliance on the promise. (Emphasis supplied). It should be sufficient that he acted on it. That is sufficient in the case of promises given on the formation of a contract. It should also be sufficient in the case of promise given on the modification or discharge of a contract."

The above narration is quoted with approval in the famous Treatise "the law Relating to Estoppel by Representation" (Sponger Bower and Turner-3rd Edition, Butterworths, 1977). The Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd., vs. Union of India (1988) SCC 86) also relied upon the above noted passage in Modern Law review, with approval.

3. LORD Denning, however, illustrated the aforesaid in W. J. Alan and co Ltd. vs. E1 Nasr Export and Import C. (1972) (2) All England Reports page 127 at page 140) in the manner following :

"a Seller may accept a less sum for his goods than the contracted price, thus inducing (his buyer) to believe that he will not enforce payment of the balance. (See Central London Property Trust Limited vs. Rees). In none of these cases does the party who acted on the belief suffer any detriment. It is not a detriment but a benefit to him to have an extension on time or to pay less or as the case may be. Nevertheless, he has conducted his affairs on the basis that he has had that benefit and it would not be equitable now to deprive him of it".

4. EVEN prior to 1988, the Supreme Court M. P. Sugar Mils vs. The State of U. P. (A 1977 SC 621) observed:

"we do not think it is necessary in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promises acting in reliance of the promise, should suffer any detriment."

In the last noted decision,