In order to convict a person under Section 4 (1) of the Bengal Criminal Law (Industrial Areas) Amendment Act, 1941, the prosecution must prove that the accused had reason to believe that the goods in his possession were stolen or fraudulently obtained and that the accused failed to account for his possession of the goods.

1. SECTION 4 (1) of the Bengal Criminal Law (industrial Areas) Amendment Act, 1941, where under the accused-petitioner has been convicted, reads (omitting portions not relevant for our present purpose) as hereunder : -

"whoever has in his possession. . . . . . . . . . any thing, which there Is reason to believe to have been stolen or fraudulently obtained, shall, if he fails to account for such possession. . . . to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, be liable to fine which may extend to one hundred rupees, or to imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months".

We are, however afraid that if we are to confirm the order of conviction passed by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, we will have to construe the pro visions to mean that whoever has in his possession anything which may be suspected to be stolen or fraudulently obtained, shall, if he fails to account foe such possession to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, be liable to be convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. We regret that we cannot jump that far.

2. ONE may suspect for no cause, or no good cause or for insufficient case. But as pointed out in Section 26, Indian Penal Code, Chapter II thereof is virtually a law lexicon for all our penal statutes in the absence of contrary indication, a person is said to have reason to believe a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing, but not otherwise. It is obvious that between "reason to believe to be stolen" and suspected to be stolen, there is inevitably a good deal of distance which cannot be covered by the mere ipse dixit of the prosecuting agency or the Court.

The accused, as admitted by the prosecution was a dealer in scrap iron and had the requisite licence to carry on such trade. He was found in the Truck which was being loaded with scrap iron at broad daylight at the crossing of busy road at about half kilometer away from his shop and on being challenged, he at once claimed to be owner. Accepting that the accused could not then produce any document in support of such purchase, it is not the case of the prosecution that dealing in the commodities in question was regulated of any law and could not be freely brought and sold. Go to even an honest man's house and you may find articles claimed to be purchased by him even though he cannot produce any document in support of such purchase which may not be handy or may be Lost, misplaced or untraceable. That by itself, cannot give rise to any reasonable belief as to their being stolen or fraudulently obtained.

3. AT the trial, however, the accused endeavoured to account for his possession by examining witness from his alleged seller, one A. P. S Organisation and by producing documents. It is not disputed that the said A. P. S. organisation is a dealer in scrap iron, but the Courts below thought that as the document ought to have been produced much earlier and the employee of the seller alleged to have issued the document was not examined, the defence case did not merit consideration. The Courts below ought to have realised that once a document is admitted in evidence, it cannot be brushed aside solely on the ground of its late production. They ought to have also realised that though a document admitted in evidence can be challenged at any later stage on the ground of not being relevant or otherwise inadmissible, no challenge can be made as to the mode or manner of proof after once it is admitted without objection. The contention that the document was produced rather late or that it was not proved by the employee himself alleged to have issued the same must be rejected as untenable.

s4. IT was urged before the Court of Appeal that the offence being a non-cognisable one, investigation by the Police has vitiated the trial and this contention was rightly repelled by the appellate Court. The principle is well settled, as enacted in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that no error, ommission or irregularity in any proceeding be