An advocate has an implied authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client and the compromise so entered would be binding on his client. This implied authority can, however, be countermanded by the client.

1. THIS is directed against the decision of the learned Subordinate; Judge, Additional Court, nadia in T. A. No. 146 of 1972 dated 10/8/1973 reversing that of the learned Munsif, Ranaghat in Title Suit No. 174 of 1971 dated 3/6/1972.

2. ADMITTEDLY, Golam Mondal, Joynal. Mondal and Pear mondal who are the present respondent filed Title Suit no. 527 of 1966 in the Court of Munsif, Ranaghat claiming a right of passage over a few plots against the present appellants Fakir Mondal, Danesh and Forman and others. Fakir Mondal was defendant no. 1 and Farman was defendant no. 5 in the said Title Suit no. 527 of 1966. The suit was fixed for hearing on 21.4.71. Admittedly, Fakir did not turn up on the date in court. It is also undisputed that a Solenma was filed by both, the parties in the suit to settle the dispute in the solenama Farman who was defendant no. 5 in that suit signed on behalf of the appellant Fakir Mondal. The. Solenama was also counter-signed by the learned Advocates of both ' sides. A decree was passed in terms of the solenama.

The plaintiff-appellant filed Title suit No. 174 of 1971 for setting aside the said compromise decree inter alia on the ground that Farman Mandal was never authorised by the plaintiff to compromise the suit on his behalf. According to the plaintiff compirpmise decree passed in title suit no 527 of 1966 was liable to be set aside because defendant no. 5 Farman Mondal had not been authorised by him to file the. Solenama and as such the solenama decree was not binding on the plaintiff.

3. THE defendant-respondents congested the suit by filing a written statement in which it was pleaded inter alia that the plaintiff-appellant Fakir Mondal was fully aware of the compromise to be filed in the suit and at his own instance Farman Mondal signed solenama on his behalf. At any rate the compromise decree could not be set aside inasmuch as the learned Advocate having authority to file the solenama duly signed the same and the compromise, decree was binding upon the plaintiff.

4. THE learned Munsif has held that Fakir Mondal had no authority to compromise the suit and that Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the defendant no. . 2 in that suit signed at the right hand top corner of the petition of compromise only for the purpose of filing it and not for the purpose of compromising the suit. He, therefore, decreed the suit. Being aggrieved, the defendant nos. 1 to 3 preferred Title appeal No. 146 of 1972 against the said decision of the learned Munsif. The learned subordinate Judge who heard and disposed of the appeal has held that the learned Advocates had express authority to enter into compromise on behalf of the present plaintiff who was defendant no. 1 in that suit. In terms of the vokalatnama which specifically empowered the learned advocate to file compromise petition on behalf of him and the compromise as entered is binding on the present plaintiff. He has further found that the circumstances of the case clearly point to the" conclusion that the present plaintiff had knowledge and consent in respect of the petition of compromise filed and that Fakir Mondal had at least the implied authority to sign in the petition of compromise on his behalf and that the compromise decree is binding on him. The learned Subordinate Judge, has, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif and dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the said decision the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.

Mr. ROUCHOUDHURY, learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the appointment of an Advocate by a party to conduct a case does not necessarily authorise him to make binding compromise on behalf of his client and the impugned compromise decree cannot be said to be binding on the appellant simply because his Advocate signed in the petition of compromise.

5. IT is well settled that an appointed Advocate has an implied authority to enter into compromise on behalf of his cl