A court can allow amendment of a plaint to include a prayer for damages, even if the original plaint did not specifically pray for such relief, unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side.

1. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the impugned order directing the return of the plaint is patently erroneous and must be struck down and the appeal', therefore, must be allowed.

2. IT is trite to say that a plaint, like other legal documents, must be read as a whole It must be read meaningfully, importing a little but of common sense, wherever necessary, and not with a desire to find fault. The plaint in this case is expressly labelled as one "for declaration, permanent injunction, mandatory injunction and damages valued at Rs. 26,100/-". The facts giving rise- to the 'cause of action for damages have been spelt but in paragraphs 21 and 25 of the plaint and in para 30, the plaintiff has not only valued the "relief for damages" tentatively at Rs. 25,000/-, but has stated further that "in the event the decree for damages be passed for an amount higher than what is claimed herein, the plaintiff shall, when so called upon, pay the deficit court-fees". It is true that at the end of that para 30, while detailing separately the reliefs claimed, no specific prayer has been made for a decree for damages. But in substance, the case, as it was enfolded, valued and stamped, was for damages also and as pointed out by' the Supreme court in Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta, (AIR 1956 SC 140 at 141) it is the substance that should count and must take precedence over mere form. Reference may also made to the observations of Gajendragadkar, J., (as his Lordship then was) in Janakiram Iyer v. Nilkanta iyer (AIR 1962 Sc 633 at 6 38-6 39) to the effect that "in construing the plaint we must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form" and it may be noted in that case also much weight was given to the fact that the valuation of the plaint was made on the footing that a certain relief was claimed and (the plaint was construed accordingly.

Be that as it-may, assuming. that the absence of a specific prayer for a decree for damages was a defect in view of the provisions of order 7 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires the relief claimed to be stated specifically, such a defect was obviously curable by amendment and an application for such amendment has in fact been filed by the plaintiff in this case. We can have no manner of doubt that such an amendment ought to have been allowed. As a result of a series of decisions of the Supreme Court, the law relating to the amendment of pleading has stood very much liberalised and in fact in Haridas Audas Thadani v. Godrej Rustom Kermani (1984 1 Supreme Court Cases 668 at 6 99), the Supreme Court has observed that "it is well-settled that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side". In Jai Jai Ram Monohar lal v. National Building Materials Supply (AIR 1969 SC 1267), the supreme Court, after pointing out (at 1269) that "rules of procedure are intended to be hand-made to the administration of justice and that a party can not be refused just relief merely because of mere mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure", has, observed that "the Court always gives; leave to amend the pleading of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide or that by his blunder, he has caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs". It has been observed further that "however negligent or careless may have been the first omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side". These observations have been quoted with approval by the Supreme court in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moti Ram (AIR 1978 SC 484) where it has been observed (at 486) that "even if a party or its Counsel is inefficient in seeing out its cas