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1975 Supreme(Cal) 226
High Court Of Calcutta
Mitra & S.K.Datta, JJ.
State Of West Bengal
Vs.
Pranjiban Dey
Decided On : Aug 01, 1975
Advocate Appeared:
Amiya Nath Bose, D.Gupta, G.Mitter, Ganendra Narayan Roy, Rayat Ghosh
A court cannot grant an interim injunction after discharging the rule in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, as an interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding.
Headnote:
ARTICLE 226 - INJUNCTION - INTERIM RELIEF - JURISDICTION - COURT'S INHERENT POWER - MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO PENDING SUIT - POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTION AFTER DISCHARGE OF RULE - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS - DISTINCTION BETWEEN STAY OF EXECUTION AND INTERIM INJUNCTION - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING GRANT OF INTERIM INJUNCTION - POWER OF HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 VIS-A-VIS OTHER COURTS - EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS - RELEVANCE OF ENGLISH EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.
Fact of the Case:
The respondents, who had taken lease of shop rooms in a market on the basis of certain representations, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the state and others to forbear from making any further construction in the market and to give any lease or license to additional traders. The trial court granted an interim injunction restraining the state from proceeding with the construction pending the rule. After considering the materials on record, the trial judge discharged the rule but extended the interim injunction for three months to enable the respondents to file a suit after serving notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to continue the interim injunction after discharging the rule. The court observed that the existence of a right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 and that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. The court further held that the power to grant an injunction after discharge of the rule is not a power derived from the old Court of Equity and that the Calcutta High Court does not enjoy any powers in this regard which the Orissa High Court does not enjoy.
Issues: 1. Whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to continue the interim injunction after discharging the rule? 2. Whether the Calcutta High Court has any powers in the matter of granting injunctions or interim orders pending an appeal which the Orissa High Court does not enjoy?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, wherein it was held that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. The court observed that the relief granted by the trial judge was not in aid of or auxiliary to the main relief that the petitioners were entitled to in the application under Article 226 and, therefore, the order of the trial judge was not sustainable. 2. The court held that the Calcutta High Court does not enjoy any powers in the matter of granting injunctions or interim orders pending an appeal which the Orissa High Court does not enjoy. The court observed that the power to grant an injunction after discharge of the rule is not a power derived from the old Court of Equity and that the Calcutta High Court's powers in this regard are derived from the Judicature Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, which are applicable to all High Courts in India.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order appealed from in respect of the injunction were set aside.
1. THIS is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice A. N. Sen, delivered on June 16, 1975 on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondents in this appeal had asked for a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the State of West Bengal and others and each of them to forbear from making any or further construction of buildings and/or shop rooms in the gardens aid open space in the market known as Dr. B. C. Roy Market as indicated in the copy of the plan annexed to the petition. The respondents had also asked for a Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the state of West Bengal and other and each of them not to erect or construct any building or shop rooms in any portion of the market and to give any lease or licence or permission to any additional traders or businessmen who were not carrying on business therein. The respondents had also asked for a Writ in the nature of Prohibition.
2. THE case of the respondents is that they have taken lease of shop rooms in the market on the basis of certain representations. These representations were made to them orally. The representation would be established by the copy of the plan they had annexed to their petition, a copy of the plan has been on display in the market premises for more than twenty years. In the trial court the respondents obtained a Rule nisi and an interim order of injunction restraining the State of West Bengal and others from proceeding to make any further construction pending the rule. When the rule came up for hearing, on a proper consideration of relevant materials, a. N. Sen, J. was of opinion that the respondents should be relegated to a suit for establishing their claim particularly for establishing the representations alleged to have been made to them by the Executive Engineer of the Government on behalf of the authorities concerned.
The learned judge was further satisfied on the materials on record that the respondents should be given a reasonable opportunity to file a suit for establishing their claim. In this view of the matter the learned judge became inclined to extend the interim order of injunction for a period of three months from June 16, 1975. The reason for extending the interim order for three months was that the respondents would serve in the meantime a notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure before filing a suit. The learned judge has observed further that if before the suit is instituted, construction is completed, a good deal of unnecessary complications will arise and the case of the respondents may, to a great extent be prejudiced in case they ultimately succeed in the suit. There may be questions of demolition of structures involving various complications and a good deal of inconvenience to the parties.
3. TAKING all these factors into consideration the learned trial judge passed an order that the interim order of injunction already granted would continue for a period of three months. He, however, discharged the rule that was issued.
4. THE main controversy before us is whether after discharging the rule without going into the merits of the case, the learned judge had jurisdiction to continue the interim injunction for a period of three months in order that the respondents could institute a proper suit in, the appropriate court after giving notice under Sec. 80 of the code of Civil Procedure.
On behalf of the appellants strong reliance has been placed on the supreme Court judgment in the State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, reported in A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 12. In that case the respondent presented a petition praying for a Mandamus against the appellants. Without expressing any opinion on the rival contentions of the parties, the High Court said that there was a case to be tried and since "at the moment" the respondents had no adequate alternative remedy having regard to Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they would suffer irreparable damage without an interim injunction. Accordingly, the pe
