Partial pre-emption is permissible in the instant case, as the concept of vicinage was of recent origin and not introduced in the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the order for partial pre-emption excluding the four plots benefited the petitioner.

1. THIS Rule is directed against the order dated 4ui January., ism, passed pre-emption Appeal No,. 1 to 1969 by the learned Munsif, Dantan, reversing the order passia by the revenue Officer, Contai, in Pre-emption case No. 38 of 1966. the petitioner in the mstani rule is the pre-emptee and the opposite party made an application for pre-emption against the petitioner on the ground of vichange under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. It has been held by the learned Munsif in disposing of the said pre-emptiom appeal No. 1 of 1969 that the applicant, held the contiguous plots of lands in respect of the lands sought to be pre-empted excepting four plots, namely; plots nos. 565, 665, 662 (3330 and 661. The said four plots were not contiguous plots and pre-emption was not allowed in respect of those lands but in respect of other lands the application for pre-emption was allowed.

2. MR. Mitter, learned Advocate appearing for me petitioner Challagenged this appeareorder or pre-emption on four grounds. Mr. Mitter Comenue that the appreciate court having Nela that the tana covered by the documents of transfer were not similar and the price of such lands also vanea, the learned Munsit erred in arbitrarally fixing the valuation by taking average price of the area of the lands in question from the total vaiuation given in die document of transfer. Mr. Mitter contended that it was the Duty of learned Munsu precisely determine are valuation of the in respect of when the order of pre emption was to be passed. It appears to us that in the instants case, the plots of lands in respect of which the application for pre- emption was not allowed were more valuable lands being bamboo grove and betel grove and as such by taking an average mean of in the total price hxea for an the lands in the documents of transfer, the present petitioner has not suffered in any was there is no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Munsif on that score. But we agree on principle that the court should deremine the valuation of land in respect of which then order for pre-emtion should be passed.

3. MR. Mitter next contended suit the anpugned order must aisu as partial pre-emption is not permissible in law. Mr. Mitter contended that as pre-emption was allowed only in respect of some plots executing the afore said four plots, the learned Munsif was not justified in passing the order of pre-emption m respect of a portion of the holding. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Mitter, pre-emption should have been allowed in respect of the entirety of the lands. It may be pointed out at this stage that by allowing partial pre-emption, Mr. Mitter's client has not suffered in any way. On the contrary, such order for partial pre-emption excluding the aforesaid four plots has neared to the benefit of the petitioner because no order for preemption has been passed against him in respect of the said four plots. But apart from this, it appears to us that on the ground of vicinage order of preemption should be made in respect of those plots which really are contiguous to the plots of the applicant. It is quite evident that the concept of vicinage is of recent origin and in the Bengal tenancy Act such concept was not introduced. Mr. Mitter relied on two decisions of this court reported in 42 C. W. N. p. 288 Surabala v. Rukmini and 38 c. W. N. p. 654 Beharilal v. Pulinbehari for the aforesaid proposition that partial pre-emption is not permissible in law. We may point out that such decisions can be clearly distinguished from the facts and circumstances of the instant case and apart from anything else the question of vicinage had not been considered in those decisions inasmuch as the pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was not known in the Bengal tenancy Act.

4. MR. Mitter next contended that the application for pre-emption is barred by limitation. In support of this contention mr. Mitter pointed out that although the application for pre-emption was made