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1985 Supreme(Cal) 94
High Court Of Calcutta
B.C. Roy, J.
Amar Nath Saha Alias A N Saha : Appellant
Versus
High Court At Calcutta : Respondent
Decided On : March 13,1985
A.N. Sahay, M.S. Banerji, Saktinath Mukherjee
The High Court's power to exercise control over District Courts and subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution of India includes disciplinary control, and this control can be exercised even in the absence of specific rules or law regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers.
Headnote:
HIGH COURT - CONTROL OVER DISTRICT COURTS - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - POWER TO SUSPEND - CONDITIONS OF SERVICE - RULES OR LAW - ARTICLE 235 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - ARTICLE 309 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - ARTICLE 311 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE - RULE OF LAW - WRIT PETITION - INTERIM INJUNCTION - STAY OF OPERATION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an Additional District Judge, challenged the departmental proceedings initiated against him, including his suspension, on the grounds that the High Court's power to exercise control over District Courts and subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution of India was subject to conditions of service prescribed by law or rules made by the Governor under Article 309. He argued that in the absence of such rules or law, the High Court lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings or suspend judicial officers.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that Article 235 of the Constitution vested complete control over District Courts and subordinate courts in the High Court, including disciplinary control. This control was subject to any right of appeal under the law regulating the conditions of service and had to be exercised in accordance with those conditions. However, the absence of rules or law under Article 309 did not render the High Court's control nugatory or inoperative.
Issues: 1. Whether the High Court's power to exercise control over District Courts and subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution of India was subject to conditions of service prescribed by law or rules made by the Governor under Article 309. 2. Whether the High Court had the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings or suspend judicial officers in the absence of such rules or law. 3. Whether the principles of natural justice were violated in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the order of suspension.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted Article 235 of the Constitution to confer complete control over District Courts and subordinate courts in the High Court, including disciplinary control. This control was subject to any right of appeal under the law regulating the conditions of service and had to be exercised in accordance with those conditions. 2. The Court held that the absence of rules or law under Article 309 did not render the High Court's control nugatory or inoperative. The High Court could initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend judicial officers in exercise of its control power, even in the absence of specific rules or law. 3. The Court found that the principles of natural justice were not violated in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the order of suspension. The petitioner had been served with the charge-sheet, given time to submit his defense, and allowed to inspect the relevant documents.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, holding that the High Court had the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution, even in the absence of specific rules or law. The Court also found that the principles of natural justice were not violated.
1. THE petitioner, an additional District Judge, has assailed the departmental proceedings purported to have been started against him wherein he is going to be suspended on the grounds inter alia, that the power of control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate to the High Courts vested in the High Court by Article 235 of the constitution of India cannot be exercised until the condition of services are prescribed by law made by the appropriate legislature or in the absence of any law by rules made by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As no law has been made nor any rules have been framed laying down the condition of service and providing for any right of appeal the High court is not competent to exercise its power of control over District Courts and Courts Subordinate thereto. The petitioner stated that he had come to know on July 29, 1983 over telephone from the then Registrar, Appellate Side, High courts Calcutta, Sri S. N. Koley, about the initiation of the departmental - proceeding against him and he was going to be suspended soon. The petitioner' has further stated that no formal explanation had ever been called for from him in regard to any of the allegations forming the subject matter of the enquiry. It has been submitted that no rule has been framed under Article 235 of the constitution empowering the High Court to hold any enquiry or to start any disciplinary proceeding against any Judicial Officer including the petitioner, who is posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore and is now on leave. It has been further submitted by the petitioner that the Governor, who is the appointing authority, has not delegated to the High Court any such power of starting departmental proceeding and suspending any judicial officer. As such the impugned order of departmental proceeding and suspension against the petitioner is without any jurisdiction and legal authority and is liable to be quashed. It has also been submitted that the High Court has no power to suspend a judicial officer It is only the Governor who can suspend under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, any Judicial Officer in absence of any Rule delegating such power to the High Court. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed for a Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to show cause to why the impugned proceeding should not be quashed, cancelled or set aside and also for a writ or prohibition prohibiting the respondents from proceeding any further with the proceeding. There is also a prayer for a writ of Certiorari upon the Respondents Nos. 1 to 4' to certify and transmit the relevant records for quashing the same. There is a prayer for ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from giving effect to the order of departmental enquiry as well as the order of suspension made, if any, pending the hearing of the petition.
2. ON August. 10, 1983, this Court after hearing the petitioner's Advocate fixed the application for hearing a week hence at the top of the list. An interim order, of maintaining status-quo as on that date was made in the mean time. The petitioner was directed to serve the copies of the application on the RESPONDENTS NOS. 2 to 4.
Against the said interim order the respondents filed an appeal being f-M-A-T- No. 325 of 1983 and made an oral prayer for Stay and obtained an order of Stay of operation of the interim order. The said appeal was heard and allowed.
3. THE petitioner thereafter field an application for Special Leave to appeal being S. L. P. (Civil) No. 1248 of 1933 in the Supreme Court of India against said judgment and order of Appellate bench of this Hon'ble Court. On March 23, 1984 the Special Leave Petition was permitted- to be withdrawn. "with liberty 'to the petitioner to move the High Court for leave to amend the writ petition in appropriate manner and raise further grounds as may be advised"
4. THEREAFTER an application for amendment
