A suit for perpetual injunction under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act is protected by Sub-section (4) of Section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and is not barred by Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

P.N. Mookerjee, J.

1. THIS appeal is by the plaintiff. It is directed against a decree of the learned trial Judge, dismissing the plaintiff's suit on a preliminary issue. That issue was in these terms:-

"Where notices under Section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code necessary before filing this suit ? If so, should the suit fail for want of the said notice ?"

THIS issue was answered by the learned trial Judge in the affirmative in both its parts, that is, against the plaintiff and, as a result thereof, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed.

2. ANOTHER issue was also discussed and decided by the learned trial Judge, namely, the issue of limitation, which was in the following terms:-

"Is the suit barred by limitation ?"

The issue, however, was found in favour of the plaintiff but, as, on the other issue, the suit had to be dismissed according to the learned trial Judge, his ultimate decree was a decree of dismissal. Against this decree, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. The point before us arises in the following manner:

3. THE instant suit was a suit, in substance, for a permanent injunction against the defendants, the Corporation of Calcutta and Sri S. B. Roy, Commissioner, Calcutta Corporation, to restrain them, "their men, officers and agents from giving effect to an illegal order, dated May 12, 1960, and/or in ' any way interfering with the plaintiff's right of property in respect of the disputed structures, namely, the C. I. sheds at Premises No. 33/2B, Wellesley Street, now known as No. 33/2B, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Calcutta.

4. THE order, referred to above, namely, the order, dated May 12, 1960, was an order for demolition of the disputed structures. That order was challenged in the plaint as illegal, invalid and an abuse of the statutory powers, vested in the Commissioner, and, as such, unenforceable in law. In the suit, there was a prayer for a declaration to the above effect, which was prayer No. 1 in the plaint, the prayer for permanent injunction, as noted above, being prayer No. 2.

5. IN the suit, the two objections, which had been considered by the learned trial Judge, namely, of a preliminary nature, related to the question of service of notice under Section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the question of limitation.

6. THE suit was dismissed by the learned trial Judge on the ground of want of the above notices, even though the question of limitation was decided by him in favour of the plaintiff. THE learned trial Judge did not go into the merits of the suit but dismissed it on the above preliminary ground. THE propriety of the said decision has been challenged before us on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Sen, arguing this appeal on behalf of his client, the appellant, has contended before us that the learned trial Judge was wrong on the question of both the above notices and his submission was that neither of the above two notices was necessary or a pre-requisite in law in the instant case. It is an admitted fact that none of the above notices was served by the plaintiff. If, therefore, the learned trial Judge's view that the said two notices were necessary for maintaining the present suit or if even one of them be necessary for the said purpose, his decree of dismissal would have to be affirmed. If, however, it be held that neither of the above two notices was necessary in the instant case, the learned trial Judge's decree of dismissal would have to be set aside, his finding on the other preliminary question of limitation being, as already stated, in favour of the plaintiff, and the case will have to be sent back for further consideration in accordance with law.

7. WE have, therefore, to address ourselves to the alleged requirement of the above notices or either of them in the instant case.

8. SO far as Section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is concerned, it is clear that the said Section would prim