In a suit for declaration of title and injunction, where the valuation of the suit is enhanced by the trial court, there must be an objective standard to determine the valuation. In the absence of such a standard, the enhancement of valuation is illegal.

1. THIS is a rule under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure obtained by the plaintiff, the valuation of whose suit for a declaration of his and a proforma defendant's title to two bata dags admeasuring between themselves 2. 98 acres, say 9 bighas, a little more or a little less, and for a permanent injunction restraining the principal defendants from holding the annual 'urush Mela' thereon, has been enhanced by the learned Munsif, Asansol, from Rs. 199 to Rs 30,000.

2. THE very first thing to do in a problem of this type is to classify the suit. That the suit out of which this rule arises comes under section 7 (iv), clause (c), of the Court Fees Act, 7 of 1870, is patent. Indeed, on that we all agree - Mr. Dutta, who appears for the petitioner, Mr. Das, who appears for the opposite party, and I, Once the classification is so, the court-fee payable, will be according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Thus, the standard to go by is the value of the relief sought, not the value of the subject-matter of the suit as in s. 7 (v) ibid. In other words, the subject-matter of the suit is not the subject-matter in suit. That, indeed, is trite, but it had to be emphasized by a Bench decision of this Court: (1) Biraja charan Nanda v. Sailaja Charan Nanda, (1938) 42 C. W. N, 667.

In the case in hand, the relief sought has been valued in the plaint at Rs. 199. No doubt, it is subject to an inquiry by the court under section 8c ibid, for determining the correct valuation. Mr. Das emphasizes the existence of such a provision as section 8c. To my thinking, however, section 8c appears to be nothing like so germane as has been imagined. Because, section BC or no section 8c, the court has always the power to revive the valuation put in by the suing party. So section 8c is there ex abundanti cautela as pointed out by a recent Bench decision of this Court : (2) Amritalal chatterjee v. Hiralal Chatterjee, (1966)70 C. W. N. 857.

3. THAT is not the real question here. The court's power to revise the valuation is always there. The real question is - a question -Mr. Dutt emphasizes : Does the court find any objective standard on the foot of which it can come to a satisfactory valuation of its own ?

4. FIRST to statute law. The suit, be it remembered, has been classified as one under section 7 (iv), clause (c), ibid, So soon as that is said, section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 7 of 1877, is attracted But no rules there are as yet thereunder. Result: there is no standard either, for the court to go by in a case of the type I am now seized of.

No doubt, Edgley, J. evolved a way of his own in coming to the determination of valuation in some cases of this nature. (3) Sourish Chandra Ray v. Shaikh Gopal Ostagar, I. L. R. (1939)2 Cal. 20, is a case in point. And this is the case Mr. Das is good enough to cite. That was a suit by certain mahomedans for a declaration that they were entitled to perform certain religious ceremonies on the occasion of the muharram every year in the courtyard attached to the palace of Maharaja sourish Chandra Ray. The formula which the learned Judge evolved was : first ascertain the extent to which the maharaja's property Will be depreciated. Then the extent of the depreciation will be the value of the benefit the plaintiffs seek to obtain in their suit. With respect, how the loss of the defendant will be gain to the suing party, the plaintiffs, is more than what I can understand. Even then, it is there to be seen that the learned Judge is not really interpreting the law but legislating. He is framing, if I may say so, with respect again, a statutory instrument of his own.

5. TO the same effect is another decision of the same learned Judge in (4) Mir Akhatdr Hossain v. Gurupada haldar and another, (1940) 44 C. W. N. 591. In the same volume, however, namely, at page 1038, there is a Bench decision: (5) Binod Behari Mukherji and others v. K. C. Biswas and company and others, where the so