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1959 Supreme(Cal) 107
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S.P. MITRA, J.
Shivadhar Sukla - Appellant
Versus
Corporation Of Calcutta - Respondent
Decided on : May 29, 1959
B.C. Dutt, P.K. Sen, P.P. Ghosh.
A stall-holder in a municipal market who has a license coupled with an interest is not entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, to restrain the revocation of the license, if the license is expressly made revocable by a condition in the license agreement. The stall-holder's only remedy in such a case is by way of damages for wrongful revocation of the license.
Headnote:
CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1951 - STALLS IN SIR STUART HOGG MARKET - RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND MARKETS COMMITTEE AND CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA DETERMINING JOINT OCCUPATION AND EXCLUDING NAME OF PLAINTIFF AS JOINT OCCUPIER - PERPETUAL INJUNCTION RESTRAINING DEFENDANTS FROM GIVING EFFECT TO RESOLUTION - SUIT FOR - MAINTAINABILITY - LICENSE GRANTED TO STALL-HOLDERS - NATURE OF - WHETHER BARE LICENSE OR LICENSE COUPLED WITH INTEREST - RIGHT TO INJUNCTION UNDER SECTION 54 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a stall-holder in Sir Stuart Hogg Market, Calcutta, filed a suit for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, the Public Utilities and Markets Committee and the Corporation of Calcutta, from giving effect to a resolution determining his joint occupation of a stall and excluding his name as a joint occupier. The plaintiff claimed that he was the sole occupier of two stalls and a joint occupier of the third stall, pursuant to a resolution passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee in 1941. The defendants contended that the plaintiff was not the sole occupier of the two stalls and that the resolution of 1941 was not binding on them. They also argued that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and not entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the plaintiff was the sole occupier of two stalls and a joint occupier of the third stall, pursuant to the resolution passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee in 1941. The court further held that the plaintiff was not a mere licensee but had a license coupled with an interest, which was an irrevocable license. However, the court also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the license was expressly made revocable by a condition in the license agreement. The court noted that the plaintiff's only remedy was by way of damages for wrongful revocation of the license.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff was the sole occupier of two stalls and a joint occupier of the third stall, pursuant to the resolution passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee in 1941? 2. Whether the plaintiff was a mere licensee or had a license coupled with an interest? 3. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the plaintiff was the sole occupier of two stalls and a joint occupier of the third stall, pursuant to the resolution passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee in 1941, based on the following findings: a. The resolution of 1941 clearly stated that the plaintiff was to be the sole occupier of two stalls and a joint occupier of the third stall. b. The plaintiff had been paying rent and taxes for all three stalls since 1941. c. The plaintiff had been issued licenses and trade permits in his name for all three stalls. d. The defendants had not produced any evidence to show that the resolution of 1941 was not binding on them. 2. The court held that the plaintiff had a license coupled with an interest, based on the following findings: a. The plaintiff had been granted a license to occupy the stalls for an indefinite period, subject to certain conditions. b. The plaintiff had paid a substantial sum of money as initial rent for the stalls. c. The plaintiff had made improvements to the stalls. d. The plaintiff had a right to transfer his interest in the stalls to another person, subject to the approval of the Corporation. 3. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, based on the following findings: a. The license granted to the plaintiff was expressly made revocable by a condition in the license agreement. b. The plaintiff's only remedy for wrongful revocation of the license was by way of damages.
Final Decision: The suit was dismissed, but each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
1. IN this suit the plaintiff has asked for (a) a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1, 2, 2a, 3 and 4 from giving any effect to the resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956 or from determining the joint occupation and excluding the name of the plaintiff as joint occupier of Stall No. 'd' 84 of Sir Stuart Hogg Market, and setting up any partition or other wall between Stall No. 84 and Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 in Block 'd' of the Market in pursuance of the resolution or at all; (b) a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and each of them from interfering with or interrupting the plaintiff's joint occupation of Stall No. 84 in Block 'd' of the Market in pursuance of the resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 11th July, 1941; (c) if necessary a declaration that the purported resolutions of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956 are ultra vires, illegal null and void, and of no force and effect; and (d) an order that the purported resolutions of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956, be set aside and cancelled.
2. THE plaintiff's case is that by a Resolution dated the 11th July, 1941 of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee constituted under the Calcutta Municipal Act III of 1923 the plaintiff was registered as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 and as joint occupier of Stall No. 84 along with one Badri Prasad Dubey, since deceased. The resolution was acted upon by the Committee and also the Corporation of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). The plaintiff and Badri Prasad adopted and accepted the resolution and acted in terms thereof. In 1940 it was agreed between Lachmi Chand Shukla since deceased, a son of the plaintiff and Badri Prasad Dubey after the efflux of a partnership for five years subsisting between them that Lachmi Chand would carry on business of his own at Stall No. D-84 and pay to Badri Prasad in consideration thereof Rs. 50/- per month. After Badri Prasad's death the money would be payable to his heirs and legal representatives. In terms of this agreement Lachmi Chand was making payments to Badri Prasad. After Lachmi Chand's death the plaintiff made the payments to Badri Prasad and thereafter to the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 who have no right or title to Stall No. D-84 except the right to receive Rs. 50/- per month.
On the 30th August, 1956 the Public Utilities and Markets Committee, the defendant No. 3 in this suit, purporting to act under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act XXXIII of 1951 passed a resolution that the names of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6, the heirs of Badri Prasad, be recorded as sole occupiers of Stall No. 84 and the plaintiff's name be recorded as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos 85 and 86. The Corporation at its meeting held on the 9th November, 1956 has approved of this resolution. It is this resolution and its approval by the Corporation which have been challenged in this suit on various grounds. After the institution of this Suit the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation was appointed. He has been added as a party to this suit and is defendant No. 2a.
3. THE Corporation's defense is that Stall No. 84 was originally allotted in 1916 to Badri Prasad. In 1934 Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 were allotted to the plaintiff's son Lachmi Chand. In 1935 on the application of Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand they were allowed to carry on business in the three stalls as partners. Since January 1, 1936 Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand carried on business in co-partnership. After the death of Lachmi Chand the plaintiff in 1941 applied for registration of his name in place of his deceased son in regard to the three stal
