In suits for possession of land, the subject matter is the land itself and the value should be taken to be the market value of the land.

1. The real question in this case is whether the learned Munsif before whom the present petitioners instituted the suit for ejectment against the opposite parties was right in holding that the plaintiffs were liable to pay ad valorem court-fees on the sum of Rs. 12,000/. It appears that after his direction to the plaintiffs to pay the deficit court-fees, the plaintiffs did not pay the same and he ordered the plaint to be rejected. The plaintiffs' appeal was summarily dismissed by the learned Judge. The plaintiffs' case in the plaint is that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were residing with the leave and license of the plaintiffs in the suit premises along with plaintiffs and their mother, that this license has been revoked by the plaintiffs, but the defendants were still continuing to occupy the said premises. As originally framed, the plaintiffs' prayer in the plaint was for a declaration of their title to the land and for delivery of khas possession to the plaintiffs on eviction of the defendants. The plaint was, however, amended and the prayer portion modified. After amendment the plaintiffs' prayer is merely for a decree for possession of the land on eviction of the defendants. As the prayer for a declaration was deliberately omitted by the plaintiffs, there is no scope for arguing that the provisions of section 7 (iv) (c) applies. As the plaint stands, it is quite clear that the plaintiffs are liable to pay court-fees in accordance with the provisions of section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act. It is equally clear that the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (v) of section 7 are not applicable as no profits arise and consequently the provisions of section 7 (v) (b) apply. The position, therefore is that the plaintiffs have to pay ad valorem court-fees according to the value of the subject-matter of the litigation and that value should be taken to be the market-value of the land. It is in that view, that the trial Court ordered an enquiry under section 8 (c) of the Court-Fees Act, And when the enquiring officer reported the value to be Rs. 12,000/- he accepted that value to be correct. On behalf of the petitioners it has been argued that the subject-matter of the litigation is not the land but the right of the plaintiffs to eject the licensee. It is argued that the value of this right will be much less than the market value of the land. If the Legislature had contented itself by merely saying that in suits for possession of lands, buildings or gardens the amount of fee payable shall be computed according to the value of the subject matter, there would have been much scope for the argument that the word 'subject-matter' should not be taken to be the same as the land, buildings or gardens. The Legislature itself however, proceeded to add that such value should be deemed to be 15 times the net profits which have arisen from the land, building or garden during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, or, if the Court sees reason to think that such profits have been wrongly estimated, fifteen times such amount as the Court may assess as such profits or according to the market value of the land, building or garden, whichever is lower and then if in the opinion of the Court, such profits are not readily ascertainable, or assessable, or where there are no such profits, according to the market value of the land, building or garden. It is true that in some cases of which mention has to be made of a decision of the Patna High Court in Musammat Barkatunnisa Begum v. Musammat Kaniz Fatema (1) I. L. R. (1927) 5 Pat. 631, and a decision in Ram Raj Tewari v. Girnandan Bhagat and others (2) I. L. R. 15 All. 63, the view was taken that it is not the property over which the suit was brought that can be called the subject matter of the suit but the relief itself that is sought which is the subject matter of the suit. In the Patna case the decision was that the subject matter of the suit is the right to eject the defendants