High Court Of Calcutta
P.B. Mukharji, Bose, JJ.
Debendra Nath Chowdhury - Appellants
Vs
Southeran Bank Ltd - Respondents
Decided on: Feb 26, 1960
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - SUIT FOR - LAND - CLAUSE 12 OF THE LETTERS PATENT OF THE CHARTERED HIGH COURTS - INTERPRETATION - A suit for specific performance of a contract to execute a document of transfer is not a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The cause of action for specific performance is the breach of contract and not the cause of action for a titular or possessor claim for land.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to grant a sub-lease of fire-clay lands in Santhal Parganas outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The defendant, a Limited Company, had its registered office and carried on business within the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The plaintiff claimed jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant had its registered office and carried on business within the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that a suit for specific performance of a contract to execute a document of transfer is not a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The cause of action for specific performance is the breach of contract and not the cause of action for a titular or possessor claim for land.
Issues: Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract to execute a document of transfer is a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a suit for specific performance of a contract to execute a document of transfer is not a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The cause of action for specific performance is the breach of contract and not the cause of action for a titular or possessor claim for land. The court relied on the following principles: * A suit for specific performance is a suit for enforcing a contract where the court is required to act only in personam. * The cause of action for specific performance is not the cause of action for the recovery of land as such or recovery of possession of land as such and the fact that such will or may be the consequence is immaterial for the purpose. * The context of clause 12 of the Letters Patent in providing three basic tests for suits- (i) for land, (ii) cause of action and (iii) place of residence or business of the defendant,-clearly indicates that where Courts are intended to act in equitable jurisdiction in personam it is the second or third test which has to be applied.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, and restored the suit for trial.
1. COURTS in India have been laboriously cultivating "land" in the field of Clause 12 of the letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts. Long and deep are the judicial furrows. Rich is the harvest. No judicial Ricardo has been able to discover any law of diminishing return in this area. The crop of judicial decisions is abundant and varied to suit every legal taste. In this appeal some examination of this harvest is inevitable before a decision can be reached.
2. THE simple question in this appeal is whether a suit for specific performance of a contract is a "suit for land" when the subject-matter of the contract is 'land'. On the soil of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this High Court, this simple question, however, has many complicated traditions.
This is an appeal from the judgment of G. K. Mitter, J., dismissing the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of an agreement to grant a sub-lease of fire-clay lands in Santhal Parganas outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The plaintiff claims jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant, a Limited Company, has its registered office and carries on business at 24, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta, within the original jurisdiction of this Court. The specific prayers in the plaint is for a decree directing the defendant to execute and register the sub-lease, and in default, directing the Registrar of this Court to execute the sub-lease on behalf of the defendant. No other reliefs are claimed except damages. No possession of the lands is claimed in this suit.
3. FOLLOWING a previous judgment of his own in Sm. Bimal Kumari v. Asoke Mitra and others, (1) 94 C. L. J. 103, the learned Judge dismissed the suit on the preliminary point that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit because specific performance of the agreement involved the delivery of possession of Land situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. That was a suit for specific performance of an agreement to purchase lands situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court. That decision was based on the learned Judge's observation in that case to the following effect:-
"the two obligations which the Vendor is bound to discharge, arise at one and the same time, viz., to execute the conveyance and to deliver possession. It was suggested that the case was covered by section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, inasmuch as it should be held that a part of the contract, viz., that relating to delivery of possession stood on a separate and independent footing from the other parts of the contract."
4. THE learned Judge applied those observations to the facts of the present case. He came to the conclusion that the sub-lease dated the 18th March, 1948 in favour of Sudhir Ranjan Dutta in. this case. shows that not only had the Bank to execute and register the lease in favour of the plaintiff but simultaneously therewith deliver possession of the land to the plaintiff and, therefore, the claim for execution of a sub-lease could not be separated from the claim for delivery of possession. This suit was decided without taking any evidence. This sub-lease in favour of Mr. Datta has not been made a formal exhibit in this suit. The only document on the record is the Agreement, dated the 12th August, 1949 for which specific performance is claimed. The relevant facts as appearing in clause 13 of this Agreement may be briefly set out for appreciating and determining the point in issue.
By a Bengali deed of lease dated the 27th August, 1941 between Rani Brojo Bala Devi of Hetampur and the defendant, a lease of fire-clay land for 15 years from the 27th August, 1941 was granted to the defendant. By a Bengali deed of sub-lease, dated the 18th March, 1948 the defendant granted to Sudhir Ranjan Datta a sub-lease of the said land for three years from the 8th March, 1948. Then by this agreement in writing dated the 12th August, 1949, the defendant agreed to grant to the plaintiff a sub-lease of the said land upon the expiry or sooner determ
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