ORDER :- This application in revision is on behalf of the creditor. On an application by the creditor, an award was made by Fatepur Debt Settlement Board on 25th January 1942. In 1944, an application was filed by the debtor before the Collector of 24 Parganaa for persuasion under S. 91(b) read with S. 44, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act for review of the award which had been made in January 1942 inasmuch as more than 60 days had expired from the making of the award. On 21st July 1944, the order passed by the Collector permitting review of the previous award was received by the Debt Settlement Board. From the order sheet maintained by the Board, it appears that after the receipt of that intimation various orders were passed from time to time, sometimes directing service of notice on the creditor and sometimes on the debtor concerned. On 12th April 1946 up to which the proceedings were continuing before the Board, the latter directed the debtor to file a formal application for review under S. 44, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act accompanied by the requisite court-fees. An application was accordingly filed on 14th June 1946. The Board however held on 8th August 1946 that there had been inordinate delay in filing the application and accordingly dismissed the prayer for review.

2. On an appeal being taken to the Appellate Officer, the order was set aside directing the Debt Conciliation Officer concerned to deal with the application according to law and on the merits. This order was affirmed by the District Judge under S. 40A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act.

3. On behalf of the creditor, it is contended that it is not competent for the Board to entertain the application for review after an award has been signed. Section 44 of the Act is in the following terms :

"Subject to any rates made under this Act - (a) a Board may, on an application made by any person interested, or of its own motion review any decision or order passed by it and pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit."

Clause (b) authorises the Appellate Officer in similar terms. There is a proviso that no order shall be varied or reversed unless an opportunity has been given to a person interested to appear and be heard in support of such order.

4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the expression decision or order used in cls. (a) and (b) of S. 44 does not include an award.

Reference is, in this connection, made to the provisions contained in S. 40 of the Act where while dealing with the right of appeal in addition to the reference made to a decision or order of a Board, an award is referred to in the next clause. It is urged that had the expression decision or order the general significant, there would not have been any necessity of making separate reference to the word award.

5. Before I refer to the effect of the use of the relevant words in S. 40 we have, in the first instance, to consider the effect of the words as appearing in S. 44. The elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of a technical legislation are used in their ordinary meaning Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, (1921) 2 AC 384 : (AIR (8) 1921 PC 240). If there is nothing appearing in the section itself either to modify or to alter or if there be nothing to qualify the language which the statute contains, it is to be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. (Vestry of St. John Hampstead v. Cotton, (1886) 12 AC 1, 6.) If the language is not only plain, but admits of only one meaning, it has repeatedly been held that the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.

6. The words order and decision are quite clear and make no differentiation between certain classes of orders and others. Looking at it from the practical point of view, there must be certain orders or decision by the Board before an award can b

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