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HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
HARRIES,BANERJEE, JJ.
Dominion of India
Versus
R.C.K.C. Nath and Co., Khulna
Civil Rule No. 802 of 1949
Decided On : 05-12-1949
Territorial Jurisdiction - Civil Procedure Code - S. 115 - S. 80 - S. 20 - [S. 115, Civil P.C.] - [Territorial Jurisdiction] - [S. 115, S. 80, S. 20] - The court discussed the territorial jurisdiction under S. 115, Civil P.C. and the principles of S. 80 and S. 20. The court emphasized that the cause of action must arise within the jurisdiction of the court for it to have territorial jurisdiction. The judgment highlighted the importance of the location of the cause of action and the presence of a subordinate office in determining territorial jurisdiction.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff sued the Governor-General of India in Council for damages for short delivery of goods entrusted to the Railway Administration for carriage from Aligarh to Khulna Railway station, now within the Dominion of Pakistan. The Sealdah Court held territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, which the defendant sought to revise under S. 115, Civil P.C.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court, emphasizing that the cause of action must arise within the court's jurisdiction for it to have territorial jurisdiction.
Issues: The issues included the territorial jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court, the correctness of the Khulna Court's decision, the effect of the order of Khulna Court in the light of Indian Independence [Legal Proceedings] Order 1947, and the limitation of the suit.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the principle that the cause of action must arise within the jurisdiction of the court for it to have territorial jurisdiction, as well as the interpretation of S. 80 and S. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Final Decision: The court made the rule absolute with costs, setting aside the order of the learned Munsif at Sealdah and concluding that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court, thereby lacking territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.
Key Points: - The court held that no part of the cause of action arose within the Sealdah jurisdiction and that the Sealdah Court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. (!) (!) - The cause of action identified as (1) entrustment of goods to the Railway Administration and (2) short delivery; the court concluded no part of these arose within Sealdah. (!) (!) - Reliance on the notification of 27 May 1948 to establish territorial jurisdiction was rejected because the notification did not show that the Railway Administration undertook to pay within Sealdah, nor did it constitute a statutory obligation; the notification could not form part of the cause of action. (!) (!) (!) (!) - The Respondent’s argument referencing Explanation 2 to S. 20, Civil P.C. was discussed but distinguished since Dominion of India is not a Corporation and no part of the cause of action arose in Sealdah. (!) (!) - The rule was made absolute, setting aside the Sealdah Court’s order and holding no territorial jurisdiction. (!) (!) - The Khulna Court’s jurisdictional ruling and related issues were not required to be decided for this application; the principal question was lack of arising cause of action within Sealdah. (!) (!)
BANERJEE, J. :- This is an application on behalf of the defendant Dominion of India asking for a revision, under S. 115, Civil P.C., of an order made by the learned First Munsiff at Sealdah. By that order, he held that the Sealdah Court had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.
2. The facts of the case are very simple and may be shortly stated. The plaintiff sued the Governor-General of India in Council for damages for short delivery of goods which, he alleges, he entrusted to the Railway Administration for carriage from Aligarh (U.P.) to Khulna Railway station, which is now within the Dominion of Pakistan.
3. After due notice under S. 80, Civil P.C. the plaintiff filed the suit on 7th December 1945, in the Munsiffs Court at Khulna.
4. On 15th August 1947, two Dominions were set up in what previously was British India. One was the Dominion of India and the other the Dominion of Pakistan. There is a Governor General for the Dominion of India and there is a Governor General for the Dominion of Pakistan.
5. After that date, the plaintiff amended his plaint by substituting the two Governor-Generals in place and stead of then defendant the Governor. General of India in Council.
6. On 19th July 1948, the Khulna Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. We are not concerned in this application with the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Khulna Court. No legal proceeding has been taken to challenge its correctness.
7. On 23rd August 1948, the plaintiff opposite party filed the plaint in the Court of the First Munsif at Sealdah, and amended the cause title of the plaint, by substituting the petitioner the Dominion of India for the Governor-General of India, by striking out the name of the Governor. General of Pakistan and by adding the General Manager, East Indian Railway as defendant 2 and the Chief Commercial Manager, of that Railway as defendant 3.
8. The plaint was further amended by averments made in the body of it to show how and when the cause of action arose. The amendments were allowed after notice to the defendant.
9. The petitioner entered appearance. Various issues were framed. One of them was whether the Sealdah Court had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. On the prayer of the petitioner, this issue was taken first and decided as a preliminary issue, and the learned Munsif has held that the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. Against this decision, this application has been made.
10. Defendants 2 and 3 do not reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court. So far as defendant 1, the Dominion of India is concerned, I think, the same principle applies, which was applicable in suits against the Secretary of State for India in Council. That principle, as stated in Rodricks v. Secy. of State, 40 Cal 808 : (21 IA 1) is this :
"The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council, where the cause of action has arisen wholly outside the ordinary original jurisdiction of that Court, on the sole ground that the Secretary of State for India in Council dwelt or carried on business or personally worked for gain within the local limits of that Court."
11. Therefore, the Sealdah Court could not assume jurisdiction over this suit on the ground of defendants residence or their carrying on business or their personally working for gain within the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court.
12. The question, therefore, is whether the cause of action or any part of it arose within the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court ?
13. In this case, the cause of action obviously is (1) entrustment of the goods to the Railway Administration and (2) short delivery.
14. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving these two facts, the Railway Administration or for the matter of that defendant 1, who now represents the Railway Administration would b
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