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1949 Supreme(Cal) 45

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
G. N. DAS,LAHIRI, JJ.
Dawoo Doyal Kothari
Versus
Giridhari Laha
Civil Rule No. 1185 of 1947
Decided On : 22-03-1949

Advocates:
Hemanta Kumar Bose - for Petitioner.Panchanon Ghose, Probodh Kumar Shome and Benoy Kumar Ghose - for Opposite Party.

The saving clause in S. 102(4), Government of India Act authorized the continuation of legal proceedings initiated before the expiry of a temporary statute.

Headnote:

S. 41, Presidency Small Cause Court Act - Jurisdiction of Court under Calcutta House Rent Control Order and Calcutta Rent Ordinance - S. 102(4), Government of India Act - Effect of saving clause on expiring statutes

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff landlord sought possession of a room from the monthly tenant for default in rent payment. The tenant applied for relief under para. 9B of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, which was later amended and replaced by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance. The principal question was whether the Small Cause Court Judge had jurisdiction to continue the proceeding under para. 9B(3) after the expiry of the Control Order.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the application filed before the expiry of the Control Order remained alive for the purposes of the proceeding, based on the saving clause in S. 102(4), Government of India Act. The Court also disagreed with a previous decision that stated the relief under the Rent Ordinance was discretionary and not mandatory.

Issues: Jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court Judge after the expiry of the Control Order and the applicability of the saving clause in S. 102(4), Government of India Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The saving clause in S. 102(4), Government of India Act authorized the continuation of the proceeding for setting aside the consent decree initiated before the expiry of the Control Order. The Court also clarified the scope and effect of the saving provision in S. 102(4) and disagreed with a previous decision regarding the discretionary nature of the relief under the Rent Ordinance.

Final Decision: The Rule was discharged, and the Court granted a certificate under S. 205, Government of India Act due to the question of construction of S. 102 of the said Act.

Judgement

LAHIRI, J. :- This Rule was obtained by the plaintiff landlord in a proceeding under S. 41, Presidency Small Cause Court Act for the recovery of possession of room No. 27 of premises No. 57 Clive Street of which the opposite party was a monthly tenant at a rent of Rs. 75 per month. The facts of the case, which are undisputed, ace as follows : the present proceeding was started on 7th March 1945, inter alia, on the ground of default in payment of rent after service of a notice to quit and on 27th July 1945 it was decreed on consent in favour of the landlord. On 29th August 1945, the Calcutta House Rent Control Order was amended by the insertion of para. 9B which inter alia provided by sub-para. (3) that where any decree or order for recovery of possession had been made before 29th August 1945 on the ground of default in payment or deposit of rent but possession had not been recovered, the proceeding for recovery of possession in execution of the decree or order shall be stayed till 29th September 1945 and if during that period the tenant made an application for setting aside the decree or order and deposited all arrears of rent and costs within such period as might be allowed by the Court, the Court which made the decree shall set it aside. On 1st October 1945 the opposite party applied for relief under para. 9B as it then stood and it was allowed by the Presidency Small Cause Court Judge; but on revision this Court set aside the order of the Small Cause Court Judge on 10th June 1946 on the ground that Para. 9B(3) as it then stood did not apply to consent decrees.

2. On 15th June 1946, Para. 9B was further amended by making it expressly applicable to consent decrees and orders and the time granted for filing an application for setting aside a consent decree or order was one calendar month expiring on 15th July 1946. On 12th July 1946 the opposite party filed a second application under the amended para. 9B for getting the reliefs contemplated by that paragraph and before this application was finally decided the Calcutta House Rant Control Order expired on 30th September 1946 and was replaced by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance [Bengal Ordinance No. V [5] of 1946] which came into operation on 1st October 1946. In spite of that, the learned Small Cause of Court Judge proceeded to decide the application and set aside the consent decree on 6th December 1946 in exercise of powers conferred by para. 9B(3), Calcutta House Rent Control Order.

3. The principal question that has arisen is this case therefore is whether in spite of the expiry of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order the Small Cause Court Judge had jurisdiction to continue the proceeding under para. 9B(3) started by the application dated 12th July 1946.

4. Mr. Bose appearing for the petitioner has argued that after the expiry of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order there was no provision in law under which the proceeding could be continued; because para. 9B (3) of the Control Order was not reproduced or re-enacted by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance. Mr. Bose has argued that S. 26 of the Rent Ordinance keeps alive only those proceedings under the Control Order for which there is a counter part in the Ordinance and as there is no provision in the Rent Ordinance corresponding to para. 9B(3) of the Control Order the proceeding under that paragraph cannot be continued under the Ordinance. This argument is of great force. The nearest approach in the Rent Ordinance to the provisions of Para. 9B(3) of the Control Order is to be found in S. 17; but that section doss not reproduce all the provisions of para. 9B; for example, it does not give the tenant an option to have the decree for ejectment set aside as a matter of right, on payment of arrears of rent and costs. In the case of Manindra Nath Banerjee v. A.K. Fazlul Huq, 51 CWN 148 Khundkar, J. took the view that an application under para. 9B filed on 15th July 1946 could be continued, if at all, only under S. 17 of the Rent Ordina



















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