The main legal point established in the judgment is the applicability of S. 5, Limitation Act to the appeal against the decision of the President or the Tribunal under the Calcutta Improvement Act, V [5] of 1911 B.C.

R. C. MITTER, J. :- Premises No. 19, Surah Third Lane, was acquired for the purpose of Improvement Scheme No. IV (Maniktolla) made by the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta and sanctioned by the Local Government under the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, V [5] of 1911 B.C. The said premises was at all material times an open piece of land comprising an area of 10 bighas 12 cottas 36 square ft. There were two tanks within it. It abutted on the sure third Lace which was to its East. It had a vista on a blind lane which stopped at a point of its Southern boundary. There was no roadway on the acquired premises in continuation of that blind lane. The said blind lane is a public one. The plot is shown in the Key plan, Ex. 1. On 27th August 1943 the Collector made his award. He gave Rs. 61548-14-0 for the land, Rs. 725 for the trees and Rs. 9341-1-0 as statutory allowance total Rs. 71614-15 odd.

2. The claimants, who are the respondents before us, were dissatisfied with the Collectors award. At their instance the Collector made a reference under the provisions of S. 18, Land Acquisition Act, to the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of chap, IV, Calcutta Improvement Act [v [5] of 1911 B.C.]. The Tribunal enhanced the compensation by Rs. 18913-1-0. The judgment of the Tribunal was delivered and signed on 30th January 1947, and the schedule of costs, which is to be taken as equivalent to a decree, was signed by the President of the Tribunal on 7th May 1948. The Province of Bengal after obtaining a certificate from the President of the Tribunal to the effect that the case was a fit case for appeal filed the Memorandum of Appeal in this Court on 26th August 1947 and the appeal was duly registered after the Stamp Reporter had reported on the day of the presentation of the Memorandum of Appeal that it was properly stamped, was in form and had been presented in time. At the time of the presentation of the Memorandum of Appeal, the appellant had doubts as to whether the appeal was still in time. So on the same day an application was filed with an officer of this Court under S. 5, Limitation Act for extending the time for filing the appeal. As, however, the Stamp Reporter repotted that the appeal had been filed in time the appellants advocate took back the said application.

3. When the appeal was opened before us the respondents advocate took a preliminary objection to the competency of the appeal on the ground that at the date of the presentation of the Memorandum of Appeal it was already barred by time. In these circumstances we allowed the appellant to move with due notice to the respondents advocate the application which had been filed under S. 5, Limitation Act on the date when the Memorandum of Appeal was presented in this Court but which had been taken back by the appellants advocate in the circumstances stated above.

4. The questions are ; (1) whether the appeal was in time on 26th August 1947, and if not (2) whether S. 5, Limitation Act can in law be invoked and (3) that if that section could be invoked whether sufficient cause has been made out for extending the period of limitation. The article in the schedule to the Limitation Act which has been made applicable to appeals against the decision of the Tribunal is Art. 156 of Sch. I, Limitation Act. According to that article, the period of limitation is 90 days from the date of the decree or order appealed from. Having regard to the fact that the decree is to bear the same date as the judgment bears the starting point of limitation would be the date when the judgment was delivered. This is admitted before us. The relevant dates for deciding the question as to whether, the appeal had been presented in time are as follows :

30-1-1947 ... Date of the judgment.

7-5-1947 ... Decree (schedule of costs) made and signed.

27-2-1947 ... Application by the appellant for certified copy of judgment.

29-3-1947 ... Court-fee payable for that copy assessed an