ORDER :- This rule was issued against an order of acquittal passed by the Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta and raises some very important questions of law.

2. A complaint was filed on behalf of the Corporation of Calcutta against the opposite party station inter alia that premises No. 43, Dharamtola Street, Calcutta was being used or permitted to be used as grains, flour and atta shop without taking out a license for the year 1945-46 under S. 386, Calcutta Municipal Act. Summons was accordingly issued against the opposite party. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 1st March 1948 held that the storing of grains in the premises was by the Post and Telegraphs Department of the Government for the benefit of the employees of that Department, and not for trade, and to that purpose could not be taken to be "storing" as contemplated under S. 386(1)(a), Calcutta Municipal Act; and that the prosecution was also bad in law as the relevant provisions could not bind the Crown. The Magistrate accordingly acquitted the accused of the charges.

3. Mr. Basu appearing on behalf of the Corporation contends that S. 386 had with Sch. 19, Calcutta Municipal Act, is attracted if any one of the different items mentioned in the Schedule are stored, irrespective of the fact whether such storing is for purposes of trade.

4. Chapter 26, Calcutta Municipal Act, is headed as for "Inspection and Regulation of premises, and of factories, trades and places of public resort." This chapter is sub-divided into two parts. Sections 880 to 384 are under the sub-heading Premises generally. Sections 385 to 391 are under the sub-heading "Factories, trades and places of public resort." It is contended on behalf of the Corporation that the provisions of S. 386 are to the interpreted without any reference to tie sub-beading "Factories, trades and places of public report." This contention cannot be upheld. The headings prefixed to a section or a set of sections in modern statutes fare regarded as preambles to those sections. It is now a settled rule that the function of the preamble is to explain what is ambiguous in the enactment and it may either restrain or explain it as best suits the intention. In re Carlton, (1946) Ch. 372 : 114 LJ Ch. 289; citing Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Toronto Railway Co., (1907) AC 316 at p. 324 : (76 LJ PC 67).

5. On an examination of S. 385 and those follow it, it is clear that each one of those section relates to either factories, trades and places of public resort. If the provisions of S. 386 not taken to be limited and applicable only factories, trades and places or public resort the result would be that whenever anything is stored, however small the quantity and for whatever purpose such storing may be made, a license will have to be taken out : Every householder must then take out a licence for keeping in his house even small quantities of articles for ordinary and daily use - an interpretation which is neither reasonable nor can be deemed to be convenient to the society at large. If the provisions are clear and unambiguous, a Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such statutory provisions except so for as it may help it in interpreting what the legislature has said. (Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Co., (1901) AC 107. But while interpreting a provision in a statute when two meanings are possible, and one of the interpretations is neither convenient nor reasonable, then such intendment as would make the provision reason. able and just, would be more acceptable than the other. Coke on Littleton 97A. In our view, on the plain reading of S. 386 that section is not of general application. Even if there be any doubt as to the proper effect and scope of the section, we have to refer to the special heading "Factories, trades and places of public resort" and it must be held that S. 386 will be attracted not with reference to storing in every premises, but only in those which are limited by the descr

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