The amount awarded by an Industrial Tribunal is not "wages" as defined in S. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and therefore, an application for the recovery of such amount is not maintainable under S. 15 of the Act.

Sen, J. :- This is an application under S. 115, Civil P. C., and also under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed by the Court of Small Causes sitting on appeal against an order passed by the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act (Act IV [4] of 1935). We might mention at once that learned advocate appearing for the petitioner at the very inception stated that he was not going to urge that Art. 227 of the Constitution applied inasmuch as the Constitution was not in force at the time the judgment of the appellate Court was passed. So we shall treat this application as one under S. 115, Civil P. C.

2. The facts which need be stated briefly are as follows : The petitioner is the Manager of Messrs. Jogendra Nath Chatterjee and Sons, a partnership firm carrying on business in engineering goods. The firm employed the opposite party Chandreswar Singh at a monthly salary of Rs. 47. He worked from 16-6-1947 till 13-2-1948 and went home on leave. He rejoined on 17-9-1948 and worked till 15-12-1948 when it is alleged he left without notice. Disputes arose between the workers and the proprietor of the firm and the disputes were referred to the Industrial (Engineering) Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, (Act XIV [14] of 1947). On 4-6-1948 the Tribunal made an award fixing the basic wages of an unskilled labourer at Rs. 30 and the dearness allowance at a maximum of Rs. 25. This award was to take effect from 1-4-1948 and would remain in force for a period of one year. As stated before on 15-12-1948 the opposite party left service of his own accord and joined another firm. This is the case of the petitioner. The petitioners further case is that he did not further appear for receiving payment of the period between 16-11-1948 to 15-12-1948. On 2-3-1948 the opposite party applied for payment under S. 15, Payment of Wages Act, claiming Rs. 158 on various counts. The petitioner admitted that the sum of Rs. 47 was due and denied liability for the rest. The Authority held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the opposite party but passed an order for the admitted amount of Rs. 47 and rejected the application with respect to the balance. Prom this there was an appeal taken to the Court of Small Causes under S. 17, Payment of Wages Act. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court allowed the appeal and the claims in full. Against this order the present application has been filed. 3. A preliminary objection has been taken that no revision under S. 115, Civil P. C, lies inasmuch as S. 17, Payment of Wages Act, provides that the decision of the Authority appointed by the Payment of Wages Act shall be final subject to an appeal. It was argued by learned advocate for the opposite party that there has been an appeal and that the petitioner has no further remedy. We are unable to accept this contention. All that the word "final" means in S. 17, Payment of Wages Act, is that no further appeal would lie from the decision of the appellate Court. It is quite clear that an appeal from the authority lies to a Court, namely, the Court of Small Causes. The appeal is not made to a "persona designata" but to a Court. Now, the Court of Small Causes is certainly subordinate to this Court and, therefore, by virtue of the previsions of S. 115, Civil P. C., this Court has the power to revise its orders passed as a Court. This view was taken in the case of Gobinda Chandra v. Rashmoni Dasya, 47 C. W. N. 473 : (A. I. R. (30) 1943 Cal. 470). We would refer specially to the passage at page 477. That case deals with the provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Under S. 40 (6), Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, the orders of the Appellate Officer have been declared to be final subject to the provisions of S. 40a. Under S. 40a revision lies from the Appellate Officers order to the District Judge. It was held that the District Judge there was not a persona designata but a Court and that consequently