A court has inherent powers to pass orders to protect the interests of a minor, even if there is no pending suit, and such powers can be exercised to restrain a person from alienating property where necessary for the minor's protection.

Sen, J. :- This Rule has been obtained by the deft. against order passed by the Dist. J., Murshidabad directing her not to alienate certain properties without the permission of the Ct.

2. The facts briefly are as follows : A suit was instituted in forma pauperis by Sabita Dasi, a minor represented by her guardian, for a declaration that she was entitled to maintenance out of the property of her deceased father and for a declaration of a charge for her maintenance on those properties. The property was in possession of her step-mother who inherited a limited interest in that property on the death of the father of Sabita Dasi. While the application for permission to sue as a pauper was pending, Sabita applied for an injunction against her step-mother restraining her from disposing of the property pending the disposal of the suit on the ground that if the property were disposed of in the meantime there would be nothing left upon which she could get a charge for her maintenance. She made the usual allegations that her step-mother was disposing of the property for the purpose of depriving her of her rights. The learned Subordinate Judge before whom this application was made did not grant an injunction in the broad terms prayed for, but restrained the step-mother from selling any property without the permission of the Ct. till the disposal of the suit. His intention obviously was to prevent the step-mother from disposing of the property except for legal necessity pending the disposal of the suit. An appeal to the Dist. J. was dismissed. Hence this rule.

3.The first question for decision is whether the Ct. had any jurisdiction to pass such an order. I must hold that the Ct. had no jurisdiction to pass any order under O. 39, R. 1, Civil P. C., as there was no pending suit at that time. This is the view expressed in cases decided by this Ct. although there are decisions to the contrary by other High Courts. It is argued, however, on behalf of the opposite party that the order was not passed under O. 39, R. 1 of the Code, but in the exercise of the Ct.s inherent powers saved by S. 151, Civil P. C. The question which therefore arises is whether the Ct. has such inherent powers. As regards this I have no doubt. Section 151, Civil P. C. saves certain powers of the Ct. and permits the Ct. to make orders ex depito justia where there is no express provision in the Code for making such orders and where there is no prohibition in the Code against the making of such orders.It seems to me that pending the decision of the pauper application the Ct. cannot be left powerless to protect the interests of the pauper. It has inherent power to pass an order of the nature of the present one if the ends of justice require the passing of such an order.

4. In the case relied on by the learned Advocate for the petnr., namely, the case of Purna Chandra v. Tara Prosad, 21 C. W. N. 870 : (a. i. R. (4) 1917 Cal. 852) the question of inherent jurisdiction was never argued or decided. All that this Ct. decided was that, pending the disposal of an application to sue in forma pauperis, there was no suit before the Ct. and therefore the Ct. had no jurisdiction to pass an order under O. 38, R. 5 of the Code, namely, an order of attachment before judgment. In the present case however the order has not been passed under O. 39, R. 1 but in the exercise of the inherent powers of the Ct. Therefore this decision has really no application ; on the other hand, there are decisions of other High Courts which support the view that a Ct. may, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, pass an order which partakes of the nature of an order under O. 39 where no suit is pending by reason of the fact that the disposal of an application for leave to sue as a pauper had not yet been decided. I would refer to one of these cases, namely, the case of Dhaneshwar Nath v. Ghanashyam Dhar, a. i. R. (27) 1940 all. 185 : (i. l. R. (1940) all. 201). The decision of the Bombay High Court h