HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
GOPENDRA NATH DAS, J.
Nagendranath Karmakar
Versus
Jotish Chandra Mukherjee
A.F.A.D. No. 869 of 1948
Decided On : 19-01-1949
EJECTMENT - LEASE - S. 106 of the T. P. Act, S. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, S. 9A of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order - The court discussed the lease inception, purpose, notice to quit, and permission of the Rent Controller. The key legal provisions interpreted were S. 106 of the T. P. Act and S. 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act, which influenced the court's decision on ejectment and compensation for damages.
Fact of the Case:
The defendants were sued for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits and damages for not vacating the premises after receiving a notice to quit. The defendants raised defenses regarding the lease inception, purpose, and service of notice to quit.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the notice to quit was valid, the purpose of the lease was for office use, and the permission of the Rent Controller was not required due to improper use of the premises.
Issues: The issues involved the validity of the notice to quit, purpose of the lease, and the requirement of permission from the Rent Controller.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the notice to quit was valid, the purpose of the lease was for office use, and the permission of the Rent Controller was not required due to improper use of the premises.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
2. The inception of the lease dates back to the year 1942 when the defendant No. 1 wrote a letter to the plaintiff agreeing to hold the demised premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 26/-. The letter recited that the tenancy would be determined by one months notice. Subsequently thereto, the defendants took a lease of an additional room and agreed to pay additional rent. The terms of the lease continued as before. The plaintiff served a notice to quit on defendants Nos. 1 and 2 requiring them to vacate the premises by the end of September, 1946. The notice recites that the defendant No. 1 is the tenant of the premises, that the defendant No. 2 had paid certain sums towards the rent of the premises and that as a matter of abundant caution, the notice to quit was also being served on the defendant No. 2. As the defendants did not vacate, the present suit was instituted. It may be noted that the permission of the Rent Controller to the institution of the suit was not taken.
3. Two sets of defences were filed to the suit. The defendant No. 1 disclaimed all interest in the demised premises and stated that he had taken the lease on behalf of his uncle, the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 2 raised several defences which I shall deal with hereafter. Both the Courts below have concurred in decreeing the plffs suit.
4. Mr. Bose appearing for the defendants appellants has raised as many as five contentions in support of the appeal.
5. In the first place, Mr. Bose contends that the Courts below were wrong in allowing the plaintiff to succeed on a case which was not made in the plaint. The argument is based on the following facts. It is submitted that in the plaint, the defendant No. 2 was stated to be a tenant. The notice also proceeded on that footing. Both the Courts below have found that the defendant No. 2 was the real tenant. This case, Mr. Bose contends, ought not to have been allowed to be raised at the hearing. In my opinion, this contention was without any substance. The admitted letters written to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by the lessor clearly indicate that the defendant No. 2 was also occupying the premises as a tenant. There can be no question of surprise or prejudice in so far as the Courts below proceeded on the view that the defendant No. 2 was the real tenant.
6. The second contention raised by Mr. Bose concerns the purpose for which the lease was taken. In the plaint, the plaintiff stated that the lease was taken for the purpose of residence. The defendants, on the other hand, stated that the purpose for which the lease was taken was manufacture. The Courts below have negatived the case of either party and have found that the purpose of the lease was to hold office. Mr. Bose contends that his version is supported by the letters, Exhibits A to A (3) to which the trial Court refers. In my opinion, the letters do not clearly indicate that the object of the lease was manufacture. The actual user to which the premises was nut does not also support the contention of Mr. Bose. The findings of the Court below are that in one of the rooms, the defendant had an office; some other rooms were used for repairs of bolts and nuts; some other rooms were in the occupation of the Central Bank of India and in those rooms, heavy materials were stacked by the Bank. In these circumstances, it is difficult for me in second appeal to upset the findings of the Courts below that the object of the lease was not manufacture. The lessee, therefore, would not be entitled to six months notice, as contended on behalf of the appellants. Moreover, the letter, Exhibit 12, which shows the inception of the lease, clearly states that the lease would be determined by one months notice. The notice that has been given in the present case exceeds the period of one month. The second contention raise
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