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1954 Supreme(Cal) 139

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S. N. GUHA RAY, J.
Gajadhar Shaw
Versus
Union of India
Civil Rule No. 3528 of 1953
Decided On : 29-07-1954

Advocates:
Ranjit Kumar Banerjee and Bimal Kumar Banerjee, for Petitioner; Ajoy Kumar Bose, for Opposite Party.

The time when the goods ought to be delivered under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is a question of fact to be determined in each case on its own facts.

Headnote:

LIMITATION - PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT, 1887, SEC. 25 - REVISION - SUIT FOR COMPENSATION AGAINST RAILWAY FOR NON-DELIVERY OF GOODS - LIMITATION ACT, 1908, ART. 31 - TIME WHEN GOODS OUGHT TO BE DELIVERED - INTERPRETATION.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff consigned 18 tons 10 cwt. of scrap iron from Ghatsila to Salimar on 10-6-1950. On arrival at the destination on 3-7-1950, only 12 tons were delivered, resulting in a short delivery of 6 tons, 10 cwt. The plaintiff filed a suit for compensation on 4-8-1951 in the Sealdah Small Cause Court, but on 30-1-1952, the court directed the plaint to be returned for presentation before the proper court. The plaint was filed again before the Howrah Small Cause Court Judge on 21-2-1952, who dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that there was a short delivery of 6 tons, 10 cwt. and the only question for decision was whether the suit was barred by limitation.

Issues: 1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908? 2. When does the time for delivery of goods commence under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to a claim for compensation for non-delivery of goods and the period of limitation is to be counted from the time when the goods ought to have been delivered. 2. The court observed that the expression "when the goods ought to be delivered" in Article 31 means exactly what it says and there is no ambiguity in the words used. The real difficulty lies in fixing this time in every individual case, making it a question of fact to be determined on its own facts.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the decision of the Small Cause Court Judge, holding that the suit was barred by limitation.

ORDER :- This is an application by the plaintiff Gajadhar Shaw for revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, of an order passed by a Small cause court Judge of Howrah, dismissing a suit for compensation against the B. N. Rly. for non-delivery of a part of the goods consigned by him. It appears that an 10-6-1950 the plaintiff consigned from Ghatsila 18 tons 10 cwt. of scrap iron which was despatched in one wagon and reached the destination, namely, Salimar on 3-7-1950. On weighment on route at Kharagpore the goods were found to weigh 18 tons 10 cwt. On arrival at the destination on 3-7-1950 when delivery was taken the goods were found to weigh 12 tons only, so that there was a short delivery of 6 tons, 10 cwt. The plaintiff asked for compensation for this short delivery. The suit was first instituted in the Small Cause Court at Sealdah on 4-8-1951, but on 30-1-1952, on the prayer of the plaintiff himself, after hearing the lawyer of the parties the Sealdah court directed the plaint to be returned for presentation before the proper court The plaint was filed again before the Small Cause Court Judge at Howrah on 21-2-1952. The learned Small Cause Court Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit simply on the ground of limitation after having found that there was undoubtedly a short delivery to the extent of 6 tons, 10 cwts.

2. The only question, therefore, for decision now is whether the suit was barred by limitation.

3. As it was a suit for non-delivery of a part of the goods, the Article of the Limitation Act which governs the suit is Art. 31 under which the starting point of limitation is the time "when the goods ought to be delivered." What the precise meaning of the expression "when the goods ought to be delivered" is has been considered in a number of cases and the point has been argued before me at considerable length by both the parties. There are two lines. There are two lines of cases in which two different views appear to have been

4. The first line of case begins with Jugal Kishore v. C. I. P. Rly. Co., ILR 45 All 43 : (AIR 1923 All 22(2)) (A). It is a case in which the plaintiff made over on 28-8-1918, certain bales of cloth to a railway company at Bombay for transmission to Chunar and as the goods did not arrive at Chunar, the plaintiff began to make inquiries about them both from the railway concerned and from the East Indian Railway company, to whose line the goods would in the ordinary course of business have been transferred at a certain junction, and for considerably over a year the Plaintiff was put off by various statements on the part of the railway companies to the effect that the matter was being inquired into, but ultimately he instituted a suit for damages on 31-3-1920. Their Lordships held that Art. 31 fixes one year from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered, and as in that case no time was fixed for the delivery of the goods, and the correspondence between the parties showed that the matter was being inquired into and that there was no refusal to deliver, up to well within a year of the suit, they were unable to hold, in the circumstances of the case, that the suit was instituted more than a year from the expiry of a reasonable time within which the goods should have been delivered. And their Lordships referred to a earlier Madras Case, viz., M. and S. M. Rly. Co. v. Bhimappa, 17 Ind Cas 419 (B).

5. The next case is Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Bisweswar Kundu 116 Ind Cas 148 : (AIR 1928 Cal 371) (C) where a company despatched six bags of biris on 15-8-1925 from Jagannath Ghat to Khulna for carriage, by the despatch service of the two companies, who were the defendants, to be delivered to the plaintiff Bisweswar Kundu who not having received the same instituted the suit claiming compensation for non-delivery. In this case, his Lordship applied to a case where the plaintiff had been kept ignorant of the loss of the goods without any fault of his own, the principle applie






















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