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1959 Supreme(Cal) 80

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
B. N. BANERJI, J.
Hari Lal Bandopadhyya
Versus
Gora Chand Mallick
Second Appeal No. 1497 of 1953
Decided On : 28-04-1959

Important Points

A quasi-easement may be implied to have been reserved in cases where the accommodation is required to be continued even after the severance, provided its continuance is found essential for the beneficial and reasonable enjoyment of the severed tenement, to the extent to which the accommodation was enjoyed before the unity of the tenements under single ownership broke up.

Subject

EASEMENT - QUASI-EASEMENT

Act Referred

EASEMENTS ACT : S.13

Headnote

EASEMENT - QUASI-EASEMENT - SEVERANCE OF TENEMENTS - IMPLIED RESERVATION - NECESSITY - EVIDENCE - INFERENCE - PRESCRIPTION - TACKING OF PERIODS OF USER.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff claimed a right of passage over the land described in schedule kha to the plaint, acquired as an easement and sought permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with that right of passage. The plaintiff alleged that the passage started from a gate on c. s. plot No. 1518, at its northeastern corner, and proceeded towards the north, until it met and connected with Seal Para Lane. The defendants disputed the plaintiff's claim, contending that the plaintiff never used the aforesaid land as a passage, and that they had an alternative passage for access to c. s. plot No. 1518 over their own land.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court found that the passage was not a public passage, but nevertheless it was found to have been in existence for a considerable number of years and used by a few persons. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had acquired a quasi-easement over the disputed passage, as it was necessary for the beneficial and reasonable enjoyment of the severed tenement, to the extent to which the accommodation was enjoyed before the unity of the tenements under single ownership broke up.

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff acquired any quasi-easement over the pathway in suit as alleged? 2. Whether the plaintiff acquired an easement of way by prescription?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the application of the doctrine of quasi-easement, in the facts and circumstances of this case, was wholly inappropriate. There was no evidence to show when the first severance of the joint ownership took place, or that at the time of leasing out c. s. plots Nos. 1519 and 1522, the landlords expressly reserved the right of way in respect of c. s. plot No. 1518. The court found that it could not be presumed that the right of way, over the disputed passage, must have been impliedly reserved for themselves by the lessors of c. s. plots Nos. 1519 and 1522 because it would be unreasonable to presume that in granting the lease, the lessors, the Naskar landlords, must have acted so stupidly as to put c. s. plot No. 1518, in their occupation, beyond access and beyond reach. 2. The court also held that the evidence of existence of the passage for a considerable number of years and its user by other tenants and by all and sundry people will not clothe the plaintiffs, interested in plot No. 1518 only, with the right of user of the passage, as a quasi-easement right, not expressly claimed in the plaint.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of both the courts below, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

Advocates:
A.C. Gupta, Panchanan Choudhury and Nirmal Kumar Choudhury, for Appellants; Shyama Charan Mitter, for Respondent.

JUDGMENT : This appeal, at the instance of the defendants, is directed against an appellate decree affirming the decree passed by a learned Munsif.

2. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was for declaration of the plaintiffs right of passage over the land described in schedule kha to the plaint, acquired as an easement and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with that right of passage. The prayers as originally made in the plaint were subsequently amended and over and above the reliefs claimed, the plaintiff further claimed declaration of the plaintiffs right of passage over the disputed land as easement of necessity.

3. According to the plaintiff, one Gourhari Das Naskar and certain other persons were owners of three plots of land, namely, c. s. plots Nos. 1518, 1519 and 1522 at Mouza Purba Barisa, within the jurisdiction of Behala P.S., District 24-Parganas. To the West of c. s. plots Nos. 1519 and 1522, according to the plaintiff, there is a passage, described in schedule kha to the plaint, which is about 75 feet long from north to south and about 6 feet wide east to west. At a distant past (when I shall hereinafter try to determine), the Naskar owners of the aforesaid 3 plots settled or leased out c. s. plots Nos. 1519 and 1522, situate to the east of the passage, described in schedule kha to the plaint, to Iswar Chandra Dutta and others at an annual rent of Rs. 6/4/-. Iswar Dutta and others were the predecessors in interest of the defendants. Lalit Mohan Dey, who is the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, purchased c. s. plot No. 1518 from the Naskar landlords, in the benam of one Gopi Nath Mullick, by a conveyance bearing the date 22-5-1933. Plaintiff alleged that the passage aforesaid started from a gate on c. s. plot No. 1518, at its northeastern corner, and proceeded towards the north, until it met and connected with Seal Para Lane. The plaintiffs claim is that he used to pass over the passage and thus acquired a right of easement thereon.

4. Although the passage was not, according to the plaintiff, included in the conveyance in favour of the predecessor in interest of the defendants, the finally published record of rights did not record the existence of any passage on the western side of c. s. plots Nos. 1519 and 1522, commencing from the northeastern corner of c. s. plot 1518, and in this respect the c. s. record was said to be incorrect.

5. In as much as the defendants were threatening to enclose the passage within their land and thereby to obstruct the passage, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of his right of easement over the passage and injunction restraining the defendants from causing obstruction to the passage.

6. The case that was introduced by the plaintiff by way of amendment of the plaint was that the three plots 1518, 1519 and 1522 were at one time under a common ownership. On severance of the tenements, the plaintiff became entitled to the use of the passage as an easement of absolute necessity, inasmuch as there was no other way out of c. s. plot No. 1518 to obtain access to Seal Para Lane and all the more so, because the plaintiff was exercising such right of use of the passage for over a considerable time.

7. The defendants, who are husband and wife, contested the suit. The defendants disputed that the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest did at all have any right of passage over the land, described in schedule kha to the plaint. According to the defendants, the plaintiff never used the aforesaid land as a passage, because they had an alternative passage for access to c. s. plot No. 1518 over their own land. The plaintiff contended that the passage referred to the plaint was being used exclusively by them and their predecessors-in-title. That being the position, the defendants challenged the claim of the plaintiff to any easement right over the disputed land.

8. Although strictly not arising out of the pleading, one of the issues framed in the suit was t






































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