2013 Supreme(Cal) 387
High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
PRASENJIT MANDAL, J.
Arup Kumar Atta
Versus
Susanta Kumar Ghosh
C.O. No. 1672 of 2013 (Appellate Side)
Decided On : 11-07-2013
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Tapabrata Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Opposite Party:H. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Prasenjit Mandal, J. This application is at the instance of the defendant and is directed against the Order No.20 dated February 1, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Alipore in Ejectment Suit No.523 of 2009 thereby rejecting the application dated September 27, 2012 filed by the defendant / petitioner herein praying for extension of time for depositing the arrears of rent calculated under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. By the same order, the learned Trial Judge has also allowed the application under Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act. Being aggrieved, this application has been preferred by the tenant.
The plaintiff / opposite party herein instituted the aforesaid suit for eviction, recovery of possession, mesne profit and other consequential reliefs against the petitioner. Then the petitioner entered an appearance in the said suit and filed a written statement controverting the allegations made in the plaint. He filed an application under Section 7(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and that petition was allowed. The application under Section 7(2) of the said 1997 Act, filed by the defendant was disposed of directing the defendant / petitioner herein to deposit arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.44,677/- in court by two installments but the petitioner failed to pay or deposit the said amount within the period as directed and thereafter he filed an application on September 27, 2012 praying for extension of time to make the deposit. That application was rejected by the impugned order.
At the same time, the application under Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act was allowed on contests without costs. Being aggrieved, this application has been preferred. Now, the question is whether the learned Trial Judge is justified by rejecting the application dated September 27, 2012 praying for extension of time to deposit the arrears of rent.
Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the materials on record, I am of the view that the learned Trial Judge has rightly addressed the issue. The application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act was disposed of on April 18, 2011 directing the defendant to pay the sum of Rs.44,677/- as arrears of rent by two installments within two months from the date of order. The defendant / petitioner did not comply with the said order. It is only on September 27, 2012 i.e. after about one year and five months from the date of order on April 18, 2011, the application for permission to deposit the arrears of rent was filed contending the ground of poverty and the fact that, his father was a heart patient and he had to remain busy for his father’s treatment.
Mr. Tapabrata Chakraborty, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the Court has enough power to enlarge the time to make the deposit and in support of his contention he has relied on the decisions of [2002] 2 Supreme 143, AIR 1985 Andhra Pradesh 23, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010, 2002 (1) CLJ 600, 2011 (3) CLJ 533 (observation under heading HELD) and thus, he has contended that Court is empowered to condone the delay, particularly, in view of the fact that the tenant was in poverty and his father was suffering from heart ailments. On the other hand, Mr. H. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party has referred to the decision of (2012)1 CLT 1 and thus, he has contended that the time limit for making deposit under Section 7(2) is inflexible and this cannot be extended by the Court under any circumstances and naturally the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable. This is a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court.
Having due regard to the submissions of the learned Advocates of both the sides and on perusal of the materials on record, I am of the view that there was an inordinate delay of more than one year and five months from the date of passing of the order on April 18, 2011 in ma