THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OF AN ORDER IS EXTREMELY LIMITED. THE COURT, SITTING IN REVIEW JURISDICTION, DOES NOT HAVE THE COMPETENCE TO REHEAR A MATTER DE NOVO, SINCE THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO COMMITTING A GROSS JURISDICTIONAL ERROR, NOR CAN A COURT ALLOW A REVIEW APPLICATION TO BECOME AN APPEAL IN DISGUISE.

Re. CAN 3116 of 2009.

1. Affidavit of service filed on behalf of the applicants be kept on record.

2. Heard the learned advocates for the parties.

3. This is an application for condonation of delay in filing a review application. After considering the submissions made by the learned advocates, I am of the view that sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay and as such the delay in filing the review application, being RVW 54 of 2009 is condoned and the application stands allowed accordingly.

RVW 54 of 2009.

4. This is an application for review of the judgment and order dated 19 January, 2009, passed by this Court in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, being C.O.3641 of 2007.

5. The applicants herein were the petitioners in the aforesaid revisional application. In the said revisional application, an order passed by the learned executing court dismissing the judgment-debtors’ application filed before it under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was sought to be challenged.

6. By the judgment and order dated 19th January, 2009, this Court, upon perusing the pleadings and after taking into consideration the respective contentions of the parties, was pleased to dismiss the said revisional application with the following, inter alia, observations:-

“ ....... As observed hereinbefore, in the facts of the instant case, the decree passed by the learned trial court was affirmed by the judgment and order of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court on 6th October, 2005, which upheld its validity. Consequently, the appellate decree passed on the very same day, merely recorded dismissal of the appeal by the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court. In the judgment and order dated 6th October, 2005, the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court, inter alia, went into all the questions sought to be raised by the judgment-debtors before the learned executing court in the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The impugned order, which takes due note of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the judgment and order dated 6th October, 2005, cannot be said to be suffering from even an iota of infirmity of reasoning or any error of law or can be said to be an order passed without jurisdiction which could warrant interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The application is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed.”

7. It has been urged by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicants in the instant review application that gross errors have crept into the judgment and order dated 19th January, 2009, passed by this Court, due to oversight and the same should be corrected by this Court without driving the parties to prefer an appeal by way of Special Leave before the Supreme Court. It has also been urged before this Court that there are ample grounds for interference in the instant application since the judgment and order passed by this Court in the revisional application amounted to manifest injustice and error, which is apparent on the face of the record.

8. Learned advocate for the applicants submits that the decree passed by the learned trial court, based on which all subsequent proceedings were initiated, was a nullity and when a decree is a nullity, the same could be assailed in execution and even in collateral proceedings. To substantiate his argument, the learned advocate relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others reported in AIR 1954 SC 340. He further submits that this Court ought to review the judgment and order dated 19th January, 2009, since it failed to consider the point of fraud. He submits that the plaintiff had practised fraud on the registering authority as well as the court by claiming ownership of the suit shop room of which Bijoy Krishna Dey was a tenant. He s