The provisions of a special statute override the provisions of a general legislature.

1. In this appeal, the point for consideration is which provision of law will be followed in the matter of sponsoring the candidates maintaining the ratio of number of posts and candidates. This is a fight between a Government department and a Board, incorporated under the statute, viz. the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973.

2. The respondent writ petitioner is the successor-in-office of the erstwhile Board, formed under the West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973. The learned Trial Judge has correctly recorded and neither of the parties had disputed that it is a body corporate and is liable to be sued and it can sue in its own name. It is strange to see that these two bodies which are directly or indirectly controlled by the Government of West Bengal, are fighting over this issue. The learned Trial Judge held that the ratio of posts and candidates should be 1 : 10, following the Recruitment Rules of 2001, which has been amended in 2005 without any deviation as to the aforesaid ratio. Incidentally, it is to be mentioned that the aforesaid Rule has been framed under the said Act having a rule making power.

3. Mr. Chakraborty says, while assailing the judgment of the learned Trial Judge that the West Bengal Regulation of Recruitment in State Government Establishments and Establishments of Public Undertakings, Statutory Bodies, Government Companies and Local Authorities Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1999) is a special statute on this subject, and he has drawn our attention to the Preamble of the said Act of 1999 and says that section 2 sub-section (11) of the said Act of 1999 in no uncertain terms covers the word "Board". Therefore, the Board which is the predecessor-in-office of the Council, will be governed and covered by this Act of 1999. Section 10 of the said Act of 1999 provides that the ratio would be 1 : 20. So, the learned Trial Judge has committed an error in this regard.

4. Therefore, the point for consideration is which law relating to sponsorship should be followed in this case. In order to give answer to the said question, we are to examine the scope and purview of the said Act of 1999. This Act of 1999 is a later legislation than that of 1973. Ordinarily this Act should have the overriding effect on any other law. Mr. Chakraborty emphasizes that the word "Board" makes it clear that the Act of 1999 would be made applicable.

5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that the definition of Board cannot be encompassed by the aforesaid Act. It is a statutory body and this has been made clear in section 2(11) of the said Act of 1999 that it does not include any authority set up under any law for the time being in force. So this Act has no manner of application.

6. We have examined with our utmost attention the aforesaid aspect. We are of the view that section 2(11) of the said Act of 1999 does not cover this particular body, viz. the West Bengal Primary Education Council, which is the successor-in-office of the Board.

7. In this case, Board has been set up by and under special statute and is not a Corporation or Society and was not set up by a statute. According to us, Primary School Council which the successor-in-office of the Board is a statutory body and it has been created under the statute. Under such circumstances, the word "Board" used in section 2(11) of the said Act of 1999 shall be construed to be brought into existence under any law and that is why it has been mentioned specifically with the words "not being a local authority, set up under any law for the time being in force and the affairs of which are controlled by the State Government."

8. We, therefore, hold that the aforesaid Act of 1999 has no manner of application in this case. As such, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Chakraborty.

9. That apart, we find another logic that the Primary School Council has been set up by a law under the rule making process. The method of spon