Under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, the civil court lacks jurisdiction to decide the issue of bargadarship, as it is exclusively within the domain of the officer appointed under s. 18(1). The officer's report under s. 21(3) is binding on the court.

This is a defendant's appeal against an appellate decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Suri, reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court. The sole question raised in this appeal, is if the civil court has power to decide an issue involving the relationship of owner and baragadar in the face of a report submitted by an officer appointed under sub-s. (1) of s. 18 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in pursuance of sub-s. (3) of S. 21. Shortly stated, the facts of the case are as follows:

2. The entire "Ka" Schedule land described in the plaint belonged to one Parbati Sundari who sold the same by two different Kobalas on the same date to the plaintiff and the defendants nos.1 and 2. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that Parbati Sundari used to cultivate her land through hired labourers before the sale and that after the sale the land was demarcated to the two sets of vendees. The defendants have for some times past been creating boundary disputes. Hence a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed against them.

3. The defendants do not deny the purchase of the moiety share of the land by the plaintiff, but their case is that they were bargadars in the lands even before the sale of the same by Parbati Sundari. They deny the possession of the plaintiff and assert that their relationship with the owner of the land as bargadar has already been decided by the J. L. R. O., an officer appointed under s. 18 (1) of the Act, for deciding such an issue.

4. The learned Munsif before whom the suit was filed, following the decision in Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Manoranjan Das & Others 1975(2) C.L.J. 447 held that the suit being for a declaration of title and permanent injunction the relationship of owner and bargadar between the parties was not directly concerned. He, therefore, ignored the report submitted by the J. L. R. O. in pursuance of sub-s. (3) of s. 21 of the Act. He, however, considered another report of the J. L. R. O. in which the defendant no. 1 was adjudged as a bargadar under the plaintiff's vendor and also a notice served by the J. L. R. O. asking the plaintiff to take owner's share of the produce. Having considered these documents in relation to the plaintiff's claim of being in Khas possession the Munsif held that the land in dispute was actually in possession of the defendants. He, therefore, decreed the suit in part declaring plaintiff's title to the suit land only and disallowing the other prayers.

5. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge also relied on 1975(2) CLJ 447 and agreeing with the Munsif ignored the J. L. R. O.'s report under s. 21 (3) of the Act. He went further and ignored the previous adjudication by the J. L. R. O. regarding the relationship of owner and bargadar between the previous owner and the defendant as also the notice served on the plaintiff asking him to take the owner's share of the produce. Depending on the other evidence he found that the plaintiff was in land and decreed the suit in full.

6. The respondents do not appear and the appeal is heard ex parte.

7. On behalf of the appellants Mr. Amit Kumar Raksit argues that the courts below failed to appreciate the implications of the decision in 1975(2) C. L. J. 447 and wrongly ignored the J. L. R. O.'s report submitted under sub-s. (3) of s. 21 of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the decision in Chapala Bala's case more closely.

8. Chapala Bala's case was that one Harendra Nath Das who was a bargadar under her had executed a registered istofanama and that thereafter she had been cultivating the land in question with the help of hired labourers who used to execute Krishimajuri agreement each year in lieu of remuneration. A portion of the suit land was described as a bamboo grove previously but the said grove was no longer in existence and the said portion was lying fallow. The defendant had approached the plaintiff for granting settlement of the same but