1998 Supreme(Cal) 519
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
Bank of Baroda
vs.
Satima Cold Storage & Ors.
CIVIL REVISION C.O. No. 2613 of 1998
Decided On : December 16, 1998
Advocate Appeared:
D.P. Bhattacharjee, B.K. Banerjee for the petitioner;
Sakti Nath Mukherjee, Ms. Kabita Mukherjee, Kishore Dutta for the opposite parties.
A civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking reliefs relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of a decree passed by a civil court prior to the coming into force of the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993, but such reliefs should be adjudicated in execution proceedings before the civil court and not in a separate suit.
Headnote:
EXECUTION OF DECREE - JURISDICTION - CIVIL COURT VS. DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - RECOVERY OF DEBTS DUE TO BANK AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACT, 1993 - SECTION 31 - DECREE PASSED BY CIVIL COURT PRIOR TO ACT - EXECUTION BEFORE CIVIL COURT - NOT DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs filed a suit in a civil court seeking a declaration that the defendant bank was not entitled to execute a compromise decree passed in an earlier suit, damages, an injunction restraining the bank from executing the decree, and a mandatory injunction directing the bank to sanction working capital limits to the plaintiffs. The defendant raised a preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit, arguing that the reliefs sought related to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of the decree and should be adjudicated in execution proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (the Act).
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit except for the reliefs relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of the decree, which should be adjudicated in execution proceedings before the civil court and not in a separate suit.
Issues: 1. Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking reliefs relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of a decree passed by a civil court prior to the coming into force of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 31 of the Act does not include execution proceedings within the meaning of "other proceeding". 2. A decree passed by a civil court prior to the coming into force of the Act should be executed before the civil court and not before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 3. Reliefs relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of a decree should be adjudicated in execution proceedings before the civil court and not in a separate suit.
Final Decision: The revisional application was allowed in part, and the order of the trial court was set aside to the extent that the reliefs relating to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of the decree could not be granted in a separate suit.
Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of a defendant in a suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of money and is directed against Order No. 60 dated August 29, 1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan in Title Suit No. 21 of 1995 thereby disposing of a preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit in affirmative.
2. The opposite parties filed the aforesaid suit in the court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan thereby praying the following reliefs:-
"(a) A decree for declaration that the defendant-bank is not entitled to execute the compromise decree dated 7.2.92 passed in T.S. 14/90.
(b) A decree for a sum of Rs. 24,48,85,000/- as pleaded in para 53 to 58 on account of damages.
(c) In the alternative for a decree of Rs. 13,82,15,000/- after adjusting Rs. 10,66,70,000/- due to the defendant bank.
(d) A declaration that the compromise decree stands varied in the manner advised by the defendant bank, in its letter dated 18.3.94, providing for payment of the decreetal dues in five equal annual instalments without any default.
(e) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from executing and/or taking steps or further steps for executing the compromise decree passed in T.S. 14/90.
(f) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant to sanction & disburse to the plaintiffs need-based working capital limit amounting to Rs. 295.27 lacs for the season 1995 an similar need based working capital limit for each & every subsequent reason till the payment of the amount legally due and payable by the pltfis. to the defdt.
(g) Such further and other reliefs which the pltfis. may be found entitled to, may also be decreed against the defdt. &
(h) For all costs, the suit be decreed against the defdt. bank".
3. The present petitioners having raised the dispute as to the competence of a Civil Court to entertain such a suit, a preliminary issue as to whether the court had jurisdiction to try the said suit was framed and the same was heard as preliminary issue as per order of this court in a first misc. appeal arising out of an order of injunction in connection with the said suit.
4. By the order impugned, the learned trial Judge has held that he has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
5. Being dissatisfied, the defendant has come up in revision.
6. Mr. Bhatacharjee, the learned advocate appearing in support of this application, at the time of hearing of the instant application, fairly conceded that except prayers (a), (d) and (e), the other reliefs claimed in the suit are quite maintainable and he was not disputing the correctness of the order impugned so far those prayers are concerned. Mr. Bhattacharjee has however restricted his submission to the aforesaid three reliefs claimed and has contended that in view of Recovery of debts due to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993 ("Act") such reliefs are available to the plaintiffs not in a civil court but before Debt Recovery Tribunal inasmuch as the decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 in favour of Bank is to be executed before Debt Recovery Tribunal and not before a Civil Court and those three reliefs relate to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990.
7. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharjee contends, a Civil Court is not entitled to go into those questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990.
8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs/opposite parties has however refuted the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee by relying upon an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this court dated August 12, 1998 in G.A. No. 1161 of 1997 (Bank of India vs. Khas Kajora Coal Company) wherein the said Division Bench consisting of Chatterjee and D.K. Jain, JJ. held that if a decree is passed by a Civil C