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1998 Supreme(Cal) 484
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Samaresh Banerjee, J.
Rai Bahadur Bissuessurlal Motilal Halwasiya Trust & Ors.
vs.
Presiding Officer, First Industrial Tribunal & Ors.
W.P. No. 18875 (W) of 1998 with W.P. No. 16297 (W) of 1998
Decided On : November 17, 1998
Advocate Appeared:
R.M. Chatterjee, for the petitioners;
B.R. Patranabis, Mrs. Uayanti Dhar Quader, for the State;
Partha Bhanja Chowdhury, S. Paul for the workman.
Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - INTERIM RELIEF - ENFORCEMENT - JURISDICTION - TRIBUNAL'S POWER - FACT OF THE CASE: The petitioner trust challenged an order of the Industrial Tribunal rejecting its application for recalling an order closing the cross-examination of a witness for the workman and making payment of interim relief to the workman as a condition precedent to participation in the adjudication proceeding. FINDING OF THE COURT: The Court held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make compliance of an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 15(2)(b) as a condition precedent for participation in the proceeding. It also held that the Tribunal can certainly evolve a procedure for enforcement of an order directing payment of interim relief to the workman, the same being in the nature of an interlocutory order but for which the very object and purpose of such a welfare legislation will be frustrated. ISSUES: Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass an order making payment of interim relief as a condition precedent to participation in the adjudication proceeding? Whether the Tribunal can evolve a procedure for enforcement of an order directing payment of interim relief to the workman? RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court relied on the judgment in Debabrata Sen vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) to hold that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make compliance of an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 15(2)(b) as a condition precedent for participation in the proceeding. It also held that the Tribunal can certainly evolve a procedure for enforcement of an order directing payment of interim relief to the workman, the same being in the nature of an interlocutory order but for which the very object and purpose of such a welfare legislation will be frustrated. FINAL DECISION: The Court dismissed the writ petitions and directed the petitioner trust to deposit a sum of Rs. 30,000/- towards arrears due and payable to the workman under the order passed by the Tribunal under section 15(2)(b) of the Act within 15th December, 1998. It also directed that if within the aforesaid period a further sum of Rs. 38,625 is paid towards arrears and the current amount to be paid month by month by the petitioner trust is paid which is to commence from 7th January, 1998, the tribunal shall resume the proceedings from the stage it reached on 10th August, 1998. MAIN LEGAL POINT: The Tribunal has jurisdiction to make compliance of an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 15(2)(b) as a condition precedent for participation in the proceeding. The Tribunal can certainly evolve a procedure for enforcement of an order directing payment of interim relief to the workman, the same being in the nature of an interlocutory order but for which the very object and purpose of such a welfare legislation will be frustrated. CATEGORY: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES SUB-CATEGORY: INTERIM RELIEF
Samaresh Banerjee, J.
Both the matters having arisen out of the same proceeding will be governed by the same judgment.
In W.P. 16297 (W) of 1998, the writ petitioner trust and one of its trustees have challenged an Order No. 133 dated 10.8.98 passed in Case No. VIII-330/85 passed by the learned Judge, First Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta.
2. By the impugned order the Tribunal has first of all rejected the application made by the petitioner trust for recalling an order dated 8th December, 1997 passed by the Tribunal by which the Tribunal closed the cross-examination of witness No. 1 for the workman.
3. By the impugned order the Tribunal made the payment of interim relief to the workman, which was awarded to the workman long ago by the Tribunal, as a condition precedent to participation in the adjudication proceeding.
4. So far as the first part of the order of the Tribunal is concerned, i.e. its refusal to recall the aforesaid order dated 8.12.97, after considering the respective submissions of the parties and considering all materials on record, I do not find any reason to interfere with such order.
5. It appears that in justification of its prayer for recalling, the present petitioners before the Tribunal gave certain explanations which were duly considered by the Tribunal. But after due consideration thereof, in fact, the tribunal has not accepted the same. One of the explanations which was given in the application for recalling was that the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner was engaged in a case before the High Court and, therefore, was unable to appear before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that for a learned Advocate in the matter of appearing before a Court there cannot be any question of priority of appearing before one Court in preference to other.
6. Although much that has been argued on that point I am of the view that when the matter was also fixed for hearing before the Tribunal, if the learned Advocate concerned was not in a position to appear in the said case because of his preoccupation in the High Court, it was incumbent upon the employer to make some other arrangements in respect thereof. There cannot be any adjournment as a matter of right.
7. It also appears to this Court from the impugned order that on the prayer of the learned Advocate for giving chance to his client to cross-examine the witness No. 1 of the workman, for ends of justice such prayer was allowed vide Order No. 132 dated 16th July, 1998 on condition of payment of costs of Rs. 500/- to the workman. Unfortunately it appears that despite such opportunity given to the said trust, the trust has failed and neglected to take such opportunity as no cost directed to be paid by the Tribunal was paid to the workman.
8. The tribunal, therefore, rightly has held that in view of such conduct of the trust there was no scope for giving any further chance of cross-examination.
9. After considering all aspect of the matter, I do not find any perversity of illegality in the order which has been passed by the tribunal rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to recall such order warranting interference by this Court.
10. As to the second part of the order, namely, making payment of interim relief as a condition precedent to participation in the proceedings although much has been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to do so, it appears to this Court that the tribunal has passed such order really following a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Sri Debabrata Sen vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. being C.O. 6632 (W) of 1996 (unreported).
11. Factually it appears that as early as in 1995 by an order dated 17th May, 1995 the prayer of the workman for grant of interim relief was allowed.
12. Admittedly despite such order the petitioner trust did not comply with the order of the tribunal and did not pay such interim relief to the workman. It appears that relying on the aforesaid judgment of this Court the workman pra
