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1999 Supreme(Cal) 450

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
Dr. Swapnadin Lahiri
vs.
Tridib Das Roy
with
Chitta Ranjan Jana
vs.
Arun Kumar Jana.
C.O. No.1410 of 1999 with C.O. No. 1764 of 1999
Decided On : August 18, 1999.

Advocates Appeared:
Subhrokamal Mukherjee, Debasish Ray, Advocates for the petitioner in C.O. No.1410 of 1999;
Jiban Ratan Chatterjee, Moloy Kumar Das, Advocates for the opposite parties;
Anil Jana, Barnali Maity, Advocates for the petitioner in C.O. No. 1764 of 1999.

An agreement for sale of immovable property is an instrument within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and therefore, stamp duty is payable as if it was a conveyance as mentioned in Item No. 23 of Schedule 1A.

Headnote:

STAMP DUTY - AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY - SCHEDULE 1A, ITEM NO. 5(d) - INTERPRETATION - STAMP DUTY PAYABLE AS IF IT WAS A CONVEYANCE - EXPLANATION ADDED TO ITEM NO. 5 OF SCHEDULE 1A - SCOPE.

Fact of the Case:

The issue before the court was to determine the stamp duty payable on an agreement for sale of immovable property in terms of Schedule 1A, Item No. 5(d) as inserted by West Bengal Act XVII of 1990.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that an agreement for sale of immovable property is an instrument as defined under Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and therefore, stamp duty is payable as if it was a conveyance as mentioned in Item No. 23 of Schedule 1A.

Issues: Whether an agreement for sale of immovable property is an instrument within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the definition of 'instrument' under Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and held that it includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The court further interpreted the explanation added to Item No. 5 of Schedule 1A, which states that an agreement for sale of immovable property includes an agreement to sell or any memorandum or acknowledgment in relation to transfer or delivery of possession of immovable property with intent to transfer• right, interest or title to such property at any future date. The court held that even in case of a pure agreement for sale where there is no promise to deliver possession immediately after or before execution of the agreement, if it is a mere agreement to transfer or delivery of possession of immovable property with an intention to transfer right, interest or title to such a property at any future date, by executing a separate conveyance, such agreement is to be stamped as if it is a conveyance as mentioned in Item No. 23 of the said Schedule.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition No. 1410 of 1999 and set aside the order of the trial court which had refused to impound the agreement for sale for insufficient stamp duty. The court dismissed the revision petition No. 1764 of 1999, which had challenged the order of the trial court directing the assessment of stamp duty on the agreement for sale as per market value.

JUDGMENT : -


Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: The only question that arises for determination in these two revisional applications is what is the stamp duty payable on an agreement for sale of immoveable property in terms of Schedule 1A, Item No. 5(d) as inserted by West Bengal Act XVII of 1990 with effect from January 31, 1994.

2. C.O. No. 1410 of 1999 arises out of a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of immoveable property wherein, when the agreement for sale was tendered for marking the same as exhibit, the defendant took a plea that the said instrument should be impounded inasmuch as only a stamp of Rs. 10/- was affixed on such agreement. According to the defendant, in view of Item No. 5(d) of the Schedule 1A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as applicable in the State of West Bengal, stamp duty should be paid as' if the same was a conveyance as mentioned in Item No. 23 of the said Schedule and accordingly it should be 5% of the market value of the property.

3. By order dated May 28, 1999 the learned trial Judge has turned down such objection with a finding that an agreement for sale does not create any right, title or interest in the immovable property and as such the said document cannot be said to be an instrument. According to the learned trial Judge, a document become instrument only when a right is created in the immoveable property by virtue of such document.

4. However, in C.O. No. 1764 of 1999, the learned trial Judge has directed to assess the disputed document according to market value after accepting the contention of the defendant therein.

5. I have heard Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee on behalf of the petitioner in C.O. No. 1410 of 1999 and Mr. Jiban Ratan Chatterjee on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party and Mr. Jana appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.O. No. 1764 of 1999.

6. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.O.No. 1410 of 1999 has contended that in view of the amendment of the Item No. 5(d) of Schedule 1A of the Indian Stamp Act as applicable in the State of West Bengal with effect from January 31, 1994, in case of an agreement of sale or lease-cum-sale of immoveable property, stamp duty payable will be same as payable on a conveyance as mentioned in Item No. 23 of the said Schedule.

7. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party has however opposed the aforesaid contention of Mr. Mukherjee and has contended that by an agreement for sale no interest is created in the property and such agreement cannot be said to be an instrument so as to apply the said provision.

8. It appears from the definition of 'instrument' as mentioned in section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, instrument includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded.

9. On the other hand, according to section 2(10) of the aforesaid Act, 'conveyance' includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether moveable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule 1 or by Schedule 1A, as the case may be.

10. The aforesaid two definitions make it abundantly clear that in order to become an instrument, what is necessary is that by such document, any right or liability is; or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. It is not necessary that any right or interest must be created in the immovable property as contended by Mr. Chatterjee.

11. Mr. Chatterjee in this connection has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Veena Hasmukh Jain & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in AIR 1999 SC 807 and contends that in the instant case the agreement sought to be enforced being a pure agreement for sale and there being no clause for transfer of possession either before or immediately after the execution of the said agreement or for delivery of f













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