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2000 Supreme(Cal) 522
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Asok Kumar Ganguly, J.
Swastik Projects (P) Ltd. and Anr.
Versus
State of West Bengal and Ors.
W.P. No. 1380 of 2000
Decided On : September 29, 2000
An authority exercising discretion under a statute must act reasonably, and a decision will be considered unreasonable if it is so absurd or outrageous that no sensible person could have arrived at it.
Headnote:
STAMP DUTY - VALUATION OF PROPERTY - ADJUDICATED VALUE - INTERPRETATION OF RULES - REASONABLENESS OF DECISION BY AUTHORITY - WRIT JURISDICTION - INDIAN STAMP (WEST BENGAL AMENDMENT) ACT, 1990 - WEST BENGAL (PREVENTION OF UNDER VALUATION OF INSTRUMENTS) RULES, 1994.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged an order passed by the Commissioner, Presidency Division, under section 47A(5) of the Indian Stamp (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1990, determining the market value of a property. The petitioner contended that the appellate authority acted unreasonably and without jurisdiction by taking into account the adjudicated value of a property in a comparable locality, which was not permissible under the West Bengal (Prevention of Under Valuation of Instruments) Rules, 1994 (PUVI Rules).
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the appellate authority did not act unreasonably or without jurisdiction by taking into account the adjudicated value of a property in a comparable locality. The court interpreted Rule 3(1) of the PUVI Rules to mean that the authority could adopt either the adjudicated value or the negotiated or settled value of a property, whichever was greater, for the purpose of valuation. The court also held that the authority's decision was not so absurd or outrageous as to be unreasonable.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellate authority acted unreasonably and without jurisdiction by taking into account the adjudicated value of a property in a comparable locality? 2. Whether the authority's decision was so absurd or outrageous as to be unreasonable?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Rule 3(1) of the PUVI Rules to mean that the authority could adopt either the adjudicated value or the negotiated or settled value of a property, whichever was greater, for the purpose of valuation. 2. The court held that the authority's decision was not so absurd or outrageous as to be unreasonable, as it fell within the parameters of the statute and was not made in bad faith.
Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed.
A. K. Ganguly, J.
The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is an order dated 17th May, 1999 passed by the Commissioner, Presidency Division as an appellate authority under section 47A(5) of the Indian Stamp (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1990. By the said order, the authority had made a determination of market value of the premises No. 40, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta-17 (hereinafter called the said property).
2. The short facts of the case are that vide conveyance dated 30th December, 1995 the petitioner and the proforma respondents No.5, 6 and 7 jointly purchased the said property for a consideration of Rs. one crore which according to the petitioner was the correct market value of the said property. Accordingly, the petitioner paid the stamp duty. The value mentioned in instrument was also paid being the consideration mentioned in the said conveyance.
3. On 30th December, 1995, the said conveyance was presented before the Additional Registrar of Assurances-II, Calcutta for registration in the prescribed form and after obtaining no objection certificate. The registering officer, however, was of the view that the true market value of the said property has not been mentioned in the deed of conveyance and called upon the petitioner to make payment of the deficit stamp duty. On reassessment, the market value of the premises was determined by the Registrar at Rs. 2,95,39,250/-.
4. As the petitioner refused to pay the stamp duty on the determined market value by the Additional Registrar of Assurances-II, Calcutta, the said Registering Officer invoked the provisions of section 47 A of the Indian Stamp Act, and the provisions of West Bengal (Prevention of Under Valuation of Instruments) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as P.U.V.I. Rules, 1994).
5. The deed was then provisionally registered and was forwarded to the 3rd respondent for determination of market value of the said property under section 47 A (2) of Stamp Act, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).
6. By an order dated 22nd January, 1998 the 3rd respondent determined the market value of the said property at Rs. 2,57,40,000/-.
7. Challenging the order dated 22nd January, 1998 the petitioner preferred an appeal under section 47A(4) of the said Act before the 2nd respondent.
8. By an order dated 12th June, 1998, the 2nd respondent set aside the order dated 22nd January, 1998 passed by the 3rd respondent and remanded the matter to the 3rd respondent for fresh determination of the market value of the said property.
9. By an order dated 23rd July, 1998 the 3rd respondent again determined the market value of the said property at Rs. 2,40,79,000/- afresh. The said order was again challenged by the petitioner by filing another appeal.
10. Even though the petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 23rd July, 1997, the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 5,6 and 7 paid the deficit stamp duty, allegedly under protest.
11. The appeal was filed before the 2nd respondent. Then came the order dated 17th May, 1999 passed by the 2nd respondent rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner and upholding the order dated 23rd July, 1998 passed by the 3rd respondent. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners challenged the said appellate order on various grounds.
12. It was of course, made clear by the reamed counsel that he was not challenging the vires of the provisions of law under which the impugned appellate order has been passed.
13. The learned counsel also made it clear that he is not urging that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It is not also his case that the appellate authority, while exercising the jurisdiction acted in breach of the principles of natural justice. But the primary challenge to the impugned order is that the appellate authority, while acting in exercise of his statutory power, has acted disregarding the statutory provisions and has, therefore, acted unreasonably and in that sense acted without jurisdiction.
14. The lea
