The benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be given for the purpose of condonation of delay in preferring an appeal, but relief can still be granted under Section 5 of the Limitation Act if sufficient cause is shown.

Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.

This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of a respondent in an appeal under section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 ("Act") and is directed against Order No AO dated January 3, 2001 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No.1 of 2000 thereby allowing an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 1460 days in the preferring such appeal.

2. The following facts are not in dispute An order of eviction of the opposite party was passed on January 11, 1996 by the Estate Officer under section 4 of the Act. Instead of preferring a statutory appeal under section 9 of the Act, the opposite party moved a writ application before this court in the month of January 1996 challenging the said order of eviction on various grounds. This court initially entertained such writ application but in the long run the same was dismissed on May 21, 1997 by S. B. Sinha, J (as His Lordship then was). The opposite party preferred a mandamus appeal before a Division Bench of this court which was ultimately dismissed on August 24, 1999. Against the order of the Division Bench dated August 24, 1999, the opposite party preferred a special leave application before the Supreme Court which was however dismissed on September 24, 1999. Thereafter on January 28, 2000, the opposite party preferred the statutory appeal under section 9 of the Act before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court against the original order of eviction dated January 11, 1996 along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of about 4 years.

3. The sum and substance of the case made out in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was that instead of preferring the appeal, the opposite party on the bona fide advice of the learned counsel wrongly approached the writ jurisdiction of this Court and unsuccessfully pursued the wrong forum up to the Apex Court till September 1999. After the dismissal of the application of special leave, on the advice of its counsel practising in the Apex Court, the opposite party preferred the appeal. However, from September 1999, one of the directors of the opposite party who was actually looking after its case had fallen seriously ill as a result the appeal was preferred four months after the dismissal of the special leave application.

4. The said application was contested by the petitioner thereby disputing the bona fides of the opposite party and opposing the prayer for condonation.

5. The learned court below by the order impugned herein allowed the prayer for condonation on condition that the opposite party would pay a sum of Rs.2001/- as costs to the petitioner.

6. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner has come up with the instant application.

7. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made twofold submissions before this Court.

8. First, Mr. Chatterjee contends that the learned court of appeal below acted illegally and with material irregularity in giving benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act and in excluding the period spent by the opposite party from the date of filing of the writ application till the date of rejection of the special leave application. According to Mr. Chatterjee, benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act is not available to an appellant in preferring an appeal; such benefit, Mr. Chatterjee proceeds, can be availed of only in filing a suit or an application. Mr. Chatterjee further contends that even other ingredients of section 14 are absent in this case. In support of such contention Mr. Chatterjee has placed a number of decisions of different courts.

9. Secondly, Mr. Chatterjee contends that the conduct of the opposite party in proceeding with the writ application cannot be said to be bona fide and there was no sufficient material available on record to