The definition of "Common Parts" in an agreement between the owners, developer, and purchasers can exclude certain areas, such as car-parking spaces and open spaces, from the definition of common space, and the developers cannot make any construction on those areas unless permitted to do so by a valid sanctioned Building Plan.

Altamas Kabir, J. : On 14th September, 1994, the respondent Nos. 1 to 20 in this appeal filed a suit against the appellants and the other respondents before the learned Assistant District Judge, Sealdah, being Title Suit No. 180 of 1994, for the following amongst other reliefs, namely,

(a) Relief be granted to the plaintiffs to institute the said suit in representative capacity under the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure;

(b) Decree for declaration that the plaintiffs and the other flat owners of the said premises have joint right, title and interest in the ground floor and adjoining open space therein and are legally entitled to enjoy the common facilities and amenities by virtue of their ownership in the respective flats of the said premises No. 194A, Satin Sen Sarani, Calcutta, described in the schedule to the plaint.

(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and their servants and agents from selling, alienating transferring and/or encumbering any part of the ground floor including the adjoining open space of the said house and premises as mentioned within the property line as indicated in the sanctioned plan of the said premises No. 194A, Satin Sen Sarani, Calcutta- 700 054;

(d) A decree for temporary injunction directing the defendants to demo lish and remove the wall constructed by them in the ground floor of the suit premises in contravention of the sanctioned plan in the rest of eastern property line of the plan;

(e) A decree for temporary injunction directing the defendant to demo lish and remove the grill and grill gates erected on the landing of stairs between 9th and 10th floor, being erected in contravention of the sanctioned plan.

2. On 19th September, 1994, the plaintiff/respondent Nos. 1 to 20 filed an application under order 39 Rules 1 and 2, read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for an order of injunction against the defendant from alienating and/or selling, and/or transferring possession of any part of the ground floor, including the adjoining open space of the suit premises as mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. By Order No.2 of even date the learned Court below passed an ex parte ad interim order of injunction restraining the defendants from alienating, selling or transferring possession of any part of the ground floor including the adjoining open space of the suit premises until further orders.

3. The appellant's herein filed an appeal in this Court against the said order, being F.M.A. No. 1363 of 2000, and the same was disposed of with a direction upon the learned trial Court to dispose of the application for temporary injunction on priority basis within three weeks from the date of communication of the order. The plaintiffs application for temporary injunction was thereafter taken up for hearing and by order No.35 dated 25th July, 2000, the learned trial Court allowed the said application along with the application filed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on contest and restrained the defendants from selling, transferring or parting with possession of the ground floor space and common areas in favour of anybody else and from making any sort of construction therein. The ad interim order passed on 19th September, 1994, was made absolute.

This appeal is directed against the said order of the learned Court below.

4. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee submitted that the learned trial Court had misconstrued the provisions contained in the Agreement for Sale between the plaintiffs/purchasers and the defendants/developers, as also the Declaration under section 10A of the West Bengal Apartment Ownership Act, 1972, which was made a part of the' Conveyance in favour of the flat owners, in coming to a finding that the plaintiffs had been able to establish a good prima facie case and that having regard to the provisions of section 3 (i) (a) of the aforesaid Act, the balance of convenience and inconvenience lay