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1989 Supreme(Cal) 519
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Ajit Kumar Sengupta & Jyotirindra Nath Hore, JJ.
I. B. Bhalla & Ors.
vs
The State
Criminal Revision No. 1753 of 1984
Decided on : December 4, 1989
D. Dutt, A. B. Chatterjee for the petitioners;
For liability under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, the rash or negligent act must be the direct or proximate cause of death.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL LAW - SECTION 304A OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE - CAUSING DEATH BY RASH OR NEGLIGENT ACT - INTERPRETATION - REQUISITES FOR LIABILITY - DIRECT OR PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH - APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, officers of Usha Fan Industries, were charged under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code for the death of a workman, Bhasa Ranjan Das, who died while performing his duty due to electrocution. The petitioners contended that the allegations against them did not prima facie make out an offense under Section 304A as there was no direct or proximate cause of death.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioners could not be held liable under Section 304A as the death of the workman was not the direct or proximate result of any rash or negligent act on their part. The court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Kurban Hussain Mohammedali Rangwalla v. State of Maharastra and Ambalal D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, which held that the rash or negligent act must be the direct or proximate cause of death for liability under Section 304A.
Issues: Whether the petitioners could be held liable under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code for the death of the workman, Bhasa Ranjan Das, in the absence of a direct or proximate cause of death.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code requires causing death by doing any rash or negligent act, and this means that death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act. The court further held that the mere fact that an accused contravenes certain rules or regulations in the doing of an act which causes death of another, does not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act.
Final Decision: The court quashed the proceedings against the petitioners under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the continuance of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court.
A. K. Sengupta, J.: This revisional application is directed against the proceeding initiated against the petitioners under s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner no. 1 is the Deputy General Manager, Usha Fan Industries looking after Administrative Department and Sales Coordination Department. The petitioner no. 2 is the Supervisor of Usha Fan Industries in Ceiling Fan Assembly and the petitioner no. 3 is the General Manager of Usha Fan Industries, a unit of Messrs. Jay Engineering Works Limited.
2. The facts leading to this revisional application are that one Bhasa Ranjan Das used to work in Ceiling Fan Division of Usha Fan Industries (hereinafter referred to as the said Industries) and he died on 2nd September 1982 while he was on duty. On 15th September 1982 at about 9-35 P.M. Amal Kanti Biswas, Inspector-in-Charge of Regent Park Police Station lodged an information with the said Police Station against the petitioner no.1 and 2 alleging commission of an offence under s. 304A of the Indian Panel Code. In the said First Information Report it was, inter alia, alleged that the deceased Bhasa Ranjan Das was an employee of Ceiling Fan Assembly of the said Industries and he was entrusted with the job of testing of Starters of Ceiling Fans by passing electric current. The deceased Bhasa Ranjan Das expired while performing his duty to electrocution on 2nd September 1982 at 17-45 hours. On receipt of the said First Information Report the police took up investigation of the case and on completion thereof submitted a charge sheet against the petitioners and others under s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code. This has been impugned in the revisional application.
3. Mr. Dutt, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has contended that the avernments in the First Information Report, the statement of witnesses under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other materials collected during investigation do not even prima facie make out an offence under s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code against any of the petitioners. There is no allegation that the death of deceased Bhasa Ranjan Das was the direct result of any act or omission on the part of the petitioners. On the contrary the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted on the basis of the allegation that they are officers of the company.
4. This contention has substance. What s.304A of the Indian Penal Code requires is causing of death by doing any rash or negligent act, and this means that death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act. In Kurban Hussein Mohammmedali Rangawalla v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 1956 SC 1616 Supreme Court quoted with approval the interpretation placed on s. 304A made by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Onkar Rampratap 4 Bom. LR 679. There Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed as follows:
"To impose criminal liability under s. 304A Indian Penal Code it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must he the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non."
In Kurban Hussain Mohammedali Rangwalla (supra) the accused who had manufactured wet paints without a licence was acquitted of the charge under s. 304A because it was held that the mere fact that he allowed the burners to be used in the same room in which turpentine and varnish were stored, even though it would be a negligent act, would not be enough to make him liable under s. 304A for the fire which broke out. The cause of the fire was not merely the presence of the burners within the room in which Varnish and turpentine were stored, though the circumstance was indirectly responsible for the fire which broke out but was also due to the overflowing of forth out of the barrels. Supreme Court observed :
"The death in this case was, therefore, in our opinion not directly th
