The interpretation of 'ownership' under S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, should be reasonable and in line with evolving concepts of ownership, considering the practical realities and the need to make the provision workable.

This is a defendant's appeal arising out of the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 516 of 1982 by the learned Additional District Judge, Ninth Court, Alipore, revising those of the learned Munsif, Fifth Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 385 of 1977.

2. The plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises as described in the schedule to the plaint, on the grounds of default, material deterioration to the condition of the suit premises and on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff.

3. By a notice to quit dated April 4, 1977, the plaintiff terminated the defendant's tenancy directing him thereby to suit and vacate the premises on the expiry of the month of May 1977.

4. However, the defendant not having vacated the suit premises in spite of the notice, the plaintiff filed the instant suit for khas possession and mesne profits.

5. The defendant contested by filing a written statement denying inter alia the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and there was a further denial to the effect that the plaintiff actually required the suit premises for his own use and occupation.

6. On the aforesaid facts the parties having gone into evidence, the learned Munsif held that there could be no eviction on the ground of default in payment of rents as well as for the alleged material deterioration to the condition of the suit premises The learned court, however, held that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises in suit but he was of the view that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and consequently he dismissed the suit.

7. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned lower appellate Court took a different view of the matter. He, however, confirmed the finding of the learned trial court that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises but contrary to the findings recorded by the learned trial court, the learned Judge to the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff had been able to prove by dependable evidence that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and on the aforesaid findings allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

8. Being aggrieved, the defendant has now come up in appeal before this Court.

9. Appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate, made two fold contentions His first contention was that the plaintiff not being the owner of the suit premises was not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, in view of the provisions of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Secondly, he contended that in view of the subsequent events, viz., the mother-in-law of the plaintiff having expired and three out of his four daughters having been married, it could not be said that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation.

10. On the other hand, Mr. Bhuniya the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. contended that the plaintiff as a member of a co-operative society having been allotted a plot of land and he having constructed a house on the said plot by taking loan from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, where he was employed and he having since repaid the loan, the plaintiff for all practical purposes is the owner of the suit premises, though the formal deed of transfer is yet to be executed by the co-operative society.

11. Regarding reasonable requirement it was contended by Mr. Bhuniya that in spire of his mother-in-law having died during the pendency of the appeal and three out of his four daughters having been married, the plaintiff still reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation.

12. Coming now to the rival contention of the parties, it was submitted by Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant that 'ownership' as contemplated in S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premi