IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta and Prasenjit Mandal, JJ.
Gautam Roy - Plaintiff
Versus
Debendra Bajoria & Ors. - Defendants
A.P.O. No. 106 of 1999, A.P.O.T. No. 96 of 1999, G.A. No. 298 of 1998 & Suit No. 129C of 1996
Decided On : July 29, 2008
AMENDMENT OF PLAINT - Limitation - Barred Claim - Amendment Sought to Incorporate Barred Claim - Principles Governing Allowance of Amendment - Distinctive Characteristics of New Cause of Action and Inconsistent Cause of Action - Test to Determine New Cause of Action.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that a deed of transfer executed by his father as trustee of a private trust was illegal and void, that the trust came to an end upon his father's death, and that the suit property vested in him as a beneficiary. The defendant contended that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiff was seeking to bring a fresh cause of action. The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff's application to amend the plaint, holding that the amendment was barred by limitation and that it would amount to bringing a fresh cause of action.
Finding of the Court:
The Calcutta High Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and set aside the trial court's order. The court held that the proposed amendment did not appear to be barred on the face of it and that the question of limitation could be decided after the filing of written statements and the adduction of evidence. The court further held that the amendment did not introduce any new statement or averment or claim new relief, and that the particulars of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, breach of trust, and willful default were part and parcel of the pleading and could be brought in subsequently by way of amendment as they did not alter the situation or case made out already.
Issues: 1. Whether the proposed amendment to the plaint was barred by limitation? 2. Whether the amendment sought to bring a fresh cause of action?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the amendment was not barred by limitation on the face of it and that the question of limitation could be decided after the filing of written statements and the adduction of evidence. 2. The court held that the amendment did not introduce any new statement or averment or claim new relief, and that the particulars of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, breach of trust, and willful default were part and parcel of the pleading and could be brought in subsequently by way of amendment as they did not alter the situation or case made out already.
Final Decision: The court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the trial court's order, and permitted the amendment of the plaint. The court directed the plaintiff to pay costs of 300 G.Ms. to the contesting defendant as a condition precedent within a period of 3 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment and order.
Sengupta, J.
This appeal is against judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder prayer for amendment of the plaint has been refused. Upon reading of the judgment and order impugned we do not find cogent reason for which the amendment was refused. The learned Judge has recorded briefly that the amendment which is sought to be made is totally barred under the provisions of law of limitation and if it is allowed by this Court at this stage shall help the petitioner (plaintiff) to bring a fresh cause of action which is totally barred under the provisions of law of limitation.
2. Now the only point is whether the aforesaid grounds are appropriate for refusal of amendment or not. In order to appreciate the present, appeal we feel that the case made out in the plaint before suggested amendment is to be set out as the learned Trial Judge felt by necessary implication that if the amendment is allowed that would amount to bringing of legally barred cause of action. Upon careful reading of the plaint as it appears to us the case of the plaintiff in gist is that the private trust created by his grand father had come to an end the moment his father died. In 1990 during the period of the trusteeship of his father the property in question was gifted to his brother who in his turn alleged to have created mortgage for obtaining loan from the first defendant. The collusive mortgage suit was filed and consent decree was passed and trust property was sold at a throw-away price. All these things had happened beyond his knowledge. The moment he came to know he had filed the suit alleging the decree obtained from this Court in connection with the suit property is a collusive act and his deceased father being the sole trustee did not have any right to create a gift in favour of his brother namely second defendant who consequently did not have any right. Nor did he acquire any right to create mortgage. So conveyance executed in terms of collusive decree is null and void. All these facts have been stated in the plaint but the relief claimed in the plaint is as follows:-
(i) "For declaration that the Deed of Transfer dated 18.6.1971 executed by Sailendra Nath Roy, since deceased, as trustee to the Trust Estate of Amarendra Nath Roy is illegal and void and the same has not affected the trust property created by the said Amarendra Nath Roy.
(ii) For declaration that the Trust created by Amarendra Nath Roy came to an end only on 23.11.90 when the said Sailendra Nath Roy died and as his death the suit property along with other residue properties covered by the said Deed of Trust vested in the plaintiff as one of the beneficiaries in terms of the said Deed of Trust.
(iii) For further declaration that the deed of Conveyance executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the defendant No. 3 is void and inoperative and the same has not affected either the Trust property or the interest of the plaintiff as beneficiary thereof.
(iv) For recovery of possession of the suit property evicting the defendant No. 1 or 3 or anybody claim through them.
(v) Injunction.
(vi) Receiver.
(vii) Attachment
(viii) For costs.
(ix) For such other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff may be entitled in law and in equity."
3. The original suit was filed in the appropriate Court at Alipore where on demurer action the plaint was returned on the ground of jurisdiction as the decree passed by the Court was under challenge and the said plaint was presented in this Court and this was registered as a regular suit. Again the defendant had taken out an application for rejection of plaint and it obtained order of status quo ex parte. Being aggrieved by the ex parte order of status quo the appellant before us had preferred an appeal, which was ultimately disposed of with clarificatory order of status quo.
4. Subsequently, the present application for amendment was taken out with the amended prayers:-
(i) "For declaration that the Deed of Transfer dated 18.6.1971 executed by
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