An amendment to a statute that removes a limitation period for filing a claim application should be given retrospective effect, and pending applications cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

Sinha, J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 8.2.96 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, 1st Court, Jalpaiguri, in M. A. C. Case No. 383 of 1991 whereby and whereunder the application for claim filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The fact that the accident took place on 4.8.90 and an application under Section 166 of the M. V. Act was filed on 17.12.91 is not in dispute. It is not also in dispute that the period of limitation for filing of such application is one year. Unfortunately, the appellant herein had not filed an application for condonation of delay. Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the M. V. Act, 1988 as it then stood reads thus :-

"No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within 6 months of the occurrence of the accident.

Provided that the claim Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of period of 6 months but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause by making the application in time."

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, submits that sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the M. V. Act was repealed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1994 and the application could not have been dismissed on the same ground. Having regard to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (1) Dhannalal v. D. P. Vijayvargiya and Others reported in AIR 1996 SC 2155, we are of the opinion that the learned Counsel is correct in his submission. The aforementioned amendment was given a retrospective effect, by reason whereof there was no limitation for filing of the claim application before the Court. When the application was pending, the aforementioned Amending Act came into force. The Apex Court held :

"7. In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act, it does not appear that the said subsection (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But, at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166, is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994, when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994 Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994, in respect of such 8ccident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section 166, was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub-section (.3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994, by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158, which provides :-

"As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a Police Officer,