The State Transport Authority has the power to consider an application for a permit for a route that covers two regions, even if a ban order has been issued by the State Transport Authority.

The judgment of the Court was as follows :––

The petitioner in this application has inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs :––

(a) A. writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to act in accordance with law and consider the prayer afresh for grant of permit in respect of the route Calcutta to Gopigunj via Kolaghat in the light of the Supreme Court decision passed in case of (1) Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 443;

(b) Further writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents including the respondent No. 3 to consider the matter and grant temporary permit on the route in question in accordance with the provisions of Sections 68 and 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act pending grant of permanent permit in question.

2. The fact of the matter which lies in a very narrow compass is that on or about 16.5.92. The Regional Transport Authority, Howrah and Midnapore adopted a joint resolution in the meeting for granting several route permits covering both the regions on reciprocal basis including the route Howrah Rly. Station to Gopigunj via Kolaghat at the ratio of 1:1. Pursuant to the said reciprocal agreement permits were granted from both the regions. The petitioner filed an application before the Regional Transport Authority, Howrah, for grant of permit on the route Gopigunj to Howrah Railway Station on 14.4.94; but the said application was rejected on the ground that there exists a ban order issued by the State Transport Authority bearing Memo No. 1577-STA in terms of its letter dated 13.4.94 which is contained in annexure 'E' to the writ application. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for grant of a permit before the State Transport Authority.

3. As the said application was not considered, a writ application was filed and Samaresh Banerjea, J. by an order dated 1.2.95, directed the State Transport Authority to consider the said application within eight weeks from the date of communication thereof. The matter was heard on 22.2.95 in the office of the State Transport Authority. The petitioner also filed a written submission. However, by an order dated 18.5.95, the said application has been rejected, inter alia, on the ground that since the route covers two regions, the petitioner may make application before the competent Regional Transport Authority.

4. Mr. Sanat Kumar Roy, Learned Advocate for the petitioner, raised a question in this application. The Learned Counsel submits that provisions of Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot have any application in a case where there exists reciprocal agreement. My attention has further been drawn to Clause (b) of Sub-section 3 of Section 68 of the said Act in terms whereof the State Transport Authority is entitled to perform the duties of Regional Transport Authority and for other reasons mentioned therein. In the instant case, the ban order has been imposed by the State Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority being an authority sub-ordinate to the State Transport Authority, therefore, would not be in a position to consider the petitioner's application for grant of permanent Stage Carriage Permit for the route Gopigunj to Howrah Railway Station via Kolaghat.

5. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the State Transport Authority also should consider the matter itself without referring back the matter to the Regional Transport Authority concerned inasmuch as, as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner had earlier applied before the Regional Transport Authority, Howrah and his application has been rejected only on the ground that a ban order has been imposed for grant of such permit by the State Transport Authority. In any event, as it is well-known that administrative discipline requires that a subordinate authority is bound by a direction made by a higher authority. In that view of the matter, the Regional Transport Authority in all possibilities, would reject the petitioner's application only on the ground of existence of