An order passed under section 4 of the Partition Act is deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the provisions of Section 8 of the Partition Act. Therefore, an appeal against such an order need not be accompanied by a certified copy of the decree.

1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the concurrent decision of the courts below and arises out of a final decree in a suit for partition.

2. Facts which are no longer in dispute may briefly be stated:

The plaintiff who is a stranger purchaser purchased six annas interest by a Kobala dated 15.2.76 and thereafter sued for partition of share in the said suit property. Defendant No. 2 who is also a stranger purchaser of two annas share in the aforesaid Bhiti, tank and Bagan properties was made a party defendant in the suit. The property originally belonged to the predecessor of defendant No. 1 who contested the suit for partition inter alia, asserting his right to pre-empt the portions .purchased by the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 under section 4 of the Partition Act. The suit was decreed in the preliminary form on June 1, 1960, by the learned Munsiff and the Court gave defendant No. 1 the liberty to purchase the shares of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 under sec. 4 of the Partition Act. On September 26, 1962, defendant No. 1 filed two petitions, one for making the decree final, inter alia, invoking his right under sec. 4 of the Partition Act and expressed his intention to purchase, the shares of plaintiff and defendant No. 2 and another for bringing of record the heirs of deceased respondent No. 2 who died in the meantime, The substitution having been effected the Court directed appointment of a Pleader Commissioner on November 19, 1964 directing the Pleader Commissioner for making partition in terms of the preliminary decree passed in the suit and for valuation of the property that the defendant No.1 intended to purchase under sec. 4 of the Partition Act. The Commissioner submitted his report on November 29, 1966 to which the plaintiff filed an objection. The objection against the Commissioner's report was heard on February 22, 1967 on which date the Court overruled the objection and accepted the report and map of the Pleader Commissioner, made the preliminary decree final with the Commissioner's report and map being made part of it. On March 3, 1967, the defendant prayed for permission to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,415,63 and the challan for the amount was passed.

3. Against this decision of the learned Munsiff accepting the Commissioner's report and making the decree final the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge, Hooghly, who dismissed the appeal on the two-fold grounds that the appeal was incompetent and that the valuation of the Commissioner was rightly accepted by the learned Munsiff. Accordingly, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal and it is against this decision that the plaintiff preferred the Second Appeal to this Court.

4. Mr. Tarun Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has assailed the decision of the learned Judge on three grounds. In the first place it was contended that the learned Judge was in error in holding that the appeal was incompetent as no certified copy of the decree was filed. Mr. Chatterjee contends that an order for sale under sec. 4 of the Partition Act is deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the provisions of Section 8 of the Partition Act and an appeal against the said order need not be accompanied by the certified copy of a decree in terms of Order 41, Rule 1 of the C.P. Code. In the second place, Mr. Chatterjee contends that there being no direction for sale of plaintiff's share in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the Partition Act the learned Trial Court was incompetent to refer the matter to the Commissioner for ascertaining the valuation of plaintiff's share or for accepting the same. Form of the decree passed in the suit was also challenged by Mr. Chatterjee. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjee contended that the valuation arrived at by the Courts below was clearly erroneous and against the weight of evidence on record and as such should be set aside by thi