In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the court's approach should be pragmatic, and substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations.

SHIB SADHAN SADHU, J.

1. By filing the instant Revisional Application the petitioner seeks to quash/set aside the impugned order No.4 dated 4th September, 2014 passed by the Learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta, in Criminal Appeal No.80 of 2014 dismissing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby dismissing the Criminal Appeal No.80 of 2014 preferred by the present petitioner challenging the order dated 3rd March, 2014 passed by the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta in connection with case No.M-13/2014.

2. The factual background giving rise to the instant application briefly stated is as follows:-

The present petitioner filed an application on 01.03.2014 under Section 12 read with Sections 17/18/19/20/22 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), seeking protection from domestic violence, maintenance and other reliefs against her brother-in-law (O.P. NO.2 herein). The Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta on hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioner granted exparte reliefs and passed order restraining the O.P. from committing any Act of Domestic Violence and also directed him to pay an interim monetary relief to the extent of Rs. 2,00,000/- for maintenance and Rs.30,000/- towards legal expenses.

Being dissatisfied with such order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta under Section 29 of the Act praying for modification of the said order dated 03.03.2014 to the extent directing the O.P.No.2 to pay Rs.1,00,000/- per month as interim monetary relief. She also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 praying for condonation of the delay of 104 days in filing the said appeal. That appeal was registered as Criminal Appeal No.80 of 2014.

The Learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court by passing the impugned order being order No.4 dated 04.09.2014 dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that there was delay of 117 days and not of 104 days as contended by the petitioner and that the ground for condonation of the delay was not properly explained nor it was satisfactory. Consequently the appeal preferred by the present petitioner was also not admitted. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner has now approached this Court with the instant Revisional Application.

3. I have heard Mr.Sabyasachi Banerjee, Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr.Sandipan Ganguly, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2. I have also perused all the available materials on record including the impugned order and judgment with meticulous care.

4. Mr. Banerjee, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is a helpless and battered lady and she did not receive any maintenance from the O.P.No.2 and she has been living in a penurious condition. So she was under financial constraint to pursue the litigation. Further although she brought the anomaly appearing in the order dated 03.03.2014 before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge after the present O.P.No.2 preferred an appeal but she could not get any clarification as to whether she was to receive the amount as interim maintenance monthly or otherwise. Mr. Banerjee further submitted that there was some misunderstanding and lack of communication between the petitioner and her erstwhile Advocate and after engagement of the new set of Advocates the proper advice could be obtained and the appeal was preferred. All these factors caused the delay in presenting the appeal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no sufficient ground in not filing the appeal in time or that the explanation given by the petitioner for such delay was not satisfactory. Nor any negligence, inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the petitioner. According to him “sufficient cause” should be l