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2012 Supreme(Cal) 1038

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
TOUFIQUE UDDIN, J.
In Re: Sarifa Bibi – Appellant
Vs.
Nil – Respondent
CRR No. 3056 of 2010
Decided On : 12/09/2012

A Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance from her husband even after the Iddat period, if the talaq pronounced by him was not in accordance with law and he had not made any reasonable and fair provision for her future.

Headnote:

MAINTENANCE - MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE) ACT, 1986 - SECTION 3(I)(A), 4 - TALAQ - VALIDITY - MAINTENANCE AFTER IDDAT PERIOD - ENTITLEMENT OF DIVORCED MUSLIM WIFE - INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a Muslim woman, filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking maintenance from her husband, the O.P. No. 2, after she was driven out of her matrimonial home following a talaq pronounced by him. The Magistrate allowed maintenance to the petitioner and her minor child, but the Sessions Judge modified the order, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to maintenance after the Iddat period.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to maintenance from her husband even after the Iddat period, as the talaq pronounced by him was not in accordance with law and he had not made any reasonable and fair provision for her future. The Court interpreted Section 3(i)(a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 to mean that the provision and maintenance to be made to the divorced wife within the Iddat period is not limited to the Iddat period, but extends for the entire life of the divorced wife unless she remarries.

Issues: 1. Whether a Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance from her husband after the Iddat period, even if the talaq pronounced by him was not in accordance with law and he had not made any reasonable and fair provision for her future? 2. Whether the provisions of Section 3(i)(a) and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 can be interpreted to mean that the provision and maintenance to be made to the divorced wife within the Iddat period is limited to the Iddat period?

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the provisions of Section 3(i)(a) and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the object of the Act, which is to protect the rights of Muslim women on divorce. The Court also held that the talaq pronounced by the husband was not in accordance with law and he had not made any reasonable and fair provision for the petitioner's future, and therefore, she was entitled to maintenance from him even after the Iddat period.

Final Decision: The Court set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and restored the order of the Magistrate, granting maintenance to the petitioner and her minor child.

ORDER :

This revision application arose out of judgment and order dated 6-8-2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Bankura in criminal revision No. 35 of 2010 thereby modifying the judgment and order dated 16-2-2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, 6th Court, Bankura in Misc. Case No. 58 of 2008 under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2. In the background of this revision the fact in gist is that the petitioner is the wife of the O.P. No. 2 and they were married according to the Islamic rites and rituals on 13.3.2005. After her marriage, the petitioner started residing with the O.P. and gave birth to a daughter who is a minor. The O.P. No. 2 used to torture the petitioner mentally and physically. Still the petitioner somehow put up with the same. On 6-1-2008, the petitioner was driven out from her matrimonial home by the O.P. No. 2 after pronouncing talaq thrice. Within one month from the date the petitioner was driven out from her matrimonial home, the O.P. No. 2 was remarried and he refused to maintain the petitioner. The talaq which was pronounced by the O.P. No. 2 was not in accordance with law. Although, the 'Din Mehr and dowry amount were returned by the O.P. No. 2 but the same being extremely paltry the petitioner was brought down to the extent of starvation. She filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for maintenance to the tune of Rs. 2000/- for herself and Rs. 1000/- for her daughter.

The O.P. No. 2 duly contested the case by filing written objection.

3. After considering the rival contentions for the parties and the materials on record, the learned Magistrate allowed maintenance amount of Rs. 600/- to the petitioner and Rs. 400/- to the minor child. Such order was assailed before the learned Sessions Judge, Bankura by the O.P. No. 2 under Section 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Revision No. 35/2010 which was transferred to the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Bankura for disposal.

4. The learned Judge without considering the main issue modified the above noted order of the learned Magistrate to the extent that the petitioner is not entitled to any maintenance after the Iddat period.

5. As such the order dated 6-8-2010 was inter alia challenged mainly on the following grounds.

6. The learned Judge held that the minor daughter is entitled to maintenance till she attains majority. The petitioner has been prejudiced with the observation of the learned Judge that the talaqi wife is not entitled to any maintenance after the Iddat period as the same goes against all settled legal parameters specially when the factum of proper talaq is in question. The learned Judge by the impugned judgment practically throttled the survival of the petitioner by compelling her to seek maintenance by filing a separate application again.

7. Now, the point for consideration is if the impugned order calls for any interference by this Court under its revisional jurisdiction.

8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no evidence as to whether the talaq was pronounced according to law. Further, it was contended that still then the petitioner is entitled to get maintenance even after the period of Iddat.

9. None appeared on behalf of the State of West Bengal.

10. But the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 1 contended that there is nothing to find fault with the impugned order. The learned counsel for the O.P. also drew my attention to the observation of the learned court below at page 6 of the judgment dated 6.8.2010.

11. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner cited before me the decisions as reported in AIR 2010 SC 305; (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 258 : (AIR 2007 SC 2215) [Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P. & Anr.] and (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (AIR 2001 SC 3958) [Daniel Latifi & Anr. v. Union of India] and submitted that the learned Judge failed to consider the position of law settled by th


















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