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2015 Supreme(Cal) 391

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
INDIRA BANERJEE And SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI, JJ.
Sri Sushanta Malik @ Susanta Malik – Appellant
Vs.
Srei Equipment Finance Limited and Anr. – Respondent
C.O. No. 136 of 2015
Decided On : 08.09.2015

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the appellant : Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, Mr. Om Narayan Rai
For the respondents: Mr. Swatarup Banerjee, Mr. Subhankar Chakraborty, Mr. Aasif Hussain, Mr. Avishek Guha, Mr. Arijit Ghosh.

Judgment :

INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

By an order dated 19th March, 2015, the Single Bench (Tandon, J.) has referred to the Division Bench, the question of whether the learned City Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’, where the pecuniary value of the subject matter of arbitration, is less than Rs.10 lakhs or whether the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all proceedings under the 1996 Act, irrespective of pecuniary value thereof.

The question has arisen in view of the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act which is set out hereinbelow for convenience:-

“2. Definitions. – (1) In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, -

(e) “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;”

Section 9 of the 1996 Act provides that a party may before, or during arbitral proceedings, or at any time after the making of the arbitral award, but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court for inter alia interim measures of protection in respect of any of the matters specified in Section 9(ii) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, under Section 14(2), parties may apply to the Court to decide any controversy on the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator, if the arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions, or fails to act without delay, or withdraws from his office, or if the Court finds that the parties had agreed to termination of his mandate. Section 34 provides for recourse to a Court, against an arbitral award, on grounds stipulated in Section 34(2).

Section 42 of the 1996 Act provides as follows:-

“Jurisdiction. – Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.”

Section 42 provides that notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in Part I of the 1996 Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, where in respect of an arbitration agreement, any application under Part I has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, and all subsequent applications arising out of that arbitration agreement or out of the arbitral proceedings, shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

There can be no doubt, that in view of the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, a Court for the purpose of Section 9, or for that matter, Section 34 or Section 14(2), would mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district, and would include the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but would not include any Civil Court inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of small causes.

In Mrs. Hosenara Begum Vs. Sk. Asraf Ali & Ors. being A.P. No.1048 of 2013, Sanjib Banerjee, J., held that “In view of Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, not all civil courts of original civil jurisdiction are entitled to entertain petitions under Part-I of the 1996 Act. Only a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district is entitl













































































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