Overqualified candidates are not entitled to Anganwadi worker positions if the advertisement specifically states that they are ineligible. However, subsequent changes to guidelines may allow such candidates to apply in the future.

Sanjib Banerjee, J.

The grievance of the petitioner is that though the petitioner was successful in the 2010 process of recruitment of Anganwadi workers, the petitioner has not yet been given an appointment. The further case of the petitioner is that the respondent authorities have found the petitioner's educational qualification of graduation to be a bar to the petitioner's appointment, though a memorandum of January 4, 2013 has altered the guidelines applicable to Anganwadi workers and a superior educational qualification can no longer be considered as a bar to a person being engaged as an Anganwadi worker.

2. The petitioner says that in view of the Full Bench opinion rendered in the judgment reported at 2010 (2) CLJ(Cal) 321 (Rina Dutta v. Anjali Mahato), the petitioner is entitled to an appointment. The petitioner also relies on a Division Bench judgment reported at 2013 WBLR(Cal) 560 (Madhuri Roy v. State of West Bengal) where Rina Dutta was interpreted by the Division Bench to simply imply that if a candidate possessed higher qualification than the prescribed norms, there was no bar to such candidate being appointed as an Anganwadi worker.

3. The interpretation of Rina Dutta as rendered in Madhuri Roy appears to be plainly contrary to what Rina Dutta lays down. However, notwithstanding an erroneous interpretation of a judgment by a superior Bench or forum, it is the interpretation which is binding on a co-ordinate or inferior Bench or forum, unless there is a contrary view of a superior forum available. Thankfully, there is an unreported decision of another Division Bench in MAT 932 of 2012 passed on September 1, 2014 (Shampa Dey v. State of West Bengal) where Rina Dutta has been understood in the appropriate perspective.

4. In Rina Dutta, the reference to the larger Bench was as to whether candidates possessing qualifications higher than the prescribed qualifications could be considered for appointment to the post. The facts in such case were that the three appellants and another applied in response to an advertisement and were selected and given appointments as Anganwadi workers in 1998. In 1999, two unsuccessful applicants instituted a petition, questioning the appointments given to the appellants as the appellants were graduates and, as such, barred from applying for the post.

5. The Full Bench observed that the scheme under which the relevant advertisement was issued provided that the appointment could be terminated at any stage for suppression of relevant information or furnishing false information; but the advertisement did not categorically state that graduate women were not eligible for the post. Paragraph 19 of the Full Bench judgment brings out the essence of the same and the consideration that weighed with the Full Bench while delivering the judgment in 2010 relating to appointments made in the year 1998 :

"It is, however, not necessary to pursue this discussion any further because we have already held that the advertisement did not specifically debar or disqualify graduate women from applying for the post of Anganwadi Workers and, therefore, the engagement of the appellants and the other private respondents in the writ petition as Anganwadi Workers could not be said to be illegal on the touchstone of the advertisement. It is true that if the provisions of the scheme were to be applied, the appellants and the 4th private respondent would be in difficulty. However, having regard to the fact that the appellants and others were appointed way back in 1998 and they have continued in employment for the last 12 years and the advertisement specifically did not disqualify or debar graduate women, we are not inclined to disturb their appointment. To that extent the appeal will have to be allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge quashing and setting aside the appointment of respondent Nos. 6 to 9 in the writ petition including the three appellants herein is set aside. The writ petition will accordingly have