In a pre-emption proceeding, the court will not adjudicate on the title of any duly executed and registered deed, but will only consider whether the right of pre-emption is available to the pre-emptor on the grounds specified under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.

Mir Dara Sheko, J.

The revisional application being C.O. 903 of 2005 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been directed against the order dated 18.12.2004 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dinhata in Miscellaneous Appeal (P) No.8 of 2003 confirming the order of pre-emption dated 15.7.2003 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dinhata in Misc. (Pre-emption) Case No.14 of 1995.

2. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Sukanta Roy and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya assisted by Mr. Raju Bhattacharya.

3. Mr. Roy representing the petitioner/appellant/pre-emptee opposite of the mis pre-emption case assailed of the judgment of the appellate court on the grounds that learned appellate court failed to consider that the pre-emption case ought to have been failed for unidenticality of the case plot since in the deed no. 10590 dated 20th July, 1977 on the basis of which the opposite party/respondent/pre-emptor/petitioner of the pre-emption case claimed pre-emption in respect of the property mentioned in the schedule of the application as co-sharer and adjoining land order does not bear the number of the impugned case plot no.1203 of khatian no.31, and the number of the plot is not matching with the R.S. Khatian no. 95/1 submitted by the opposite party wherefrom also there is unidenticality in the name of the opposite party, where it was recorded as Kush Chandra Ghosh whereas the name of the opposite party is Kush Kanta Sarkar. Further submitted that Parul Bala Barman by purchase from whom the opposite party claimed to have become co-sharer had no saleable right at that relevant time. Further argued that since learned Appellate Court declined to affirm the order of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage but accepted the order of the learned Trial Judge allowing pre-emption on the ground of co-sharership, the object of pre-emption would be frustrated. Mr. Roy with a view to strengthen his submissions relied on the following decisions :-

I. C.O. 1727 of 1994 (Smt. Renuka Chakraborty v. Mahadev Mondal & Ors.)

II. The judgment in the case of Sri Dushasan Kayal v. Smt. Sandhyarani Das reported in 1997(2) CLJ 391 and

III. The case of Samsul Haque v. Hossain Ali Mondal & Ors. reported in 2000(1) CLJ 632.

4. Mr. Bhattacharya in his turn submitted that since either before learned Trial Judge by filing written statement or before First Appellate Court in the memo of appeal or even in the application before this court any ground on identifiability of the property sought to be pre-empted was never questioned, and so that point would not be allowed to be agitated afresh in argument only before this revisional court. The court in exercising the jurisdiction under article 227 of the Constitution of India in a supervisory nature would see whether the decision making process was directed in right direction or not. Drawing my attention to the defence taken by the petitioner and also the relevant part of the evidence on the record including the observations of both the courts in the judgment submitted that the impugned judgement having no sufferance from perversity or illegality, the said application should be dismissed. Points for determination arose before this Court as follows :-

(a) Whether the point on unidenticality of the plot in question as urged by Mr. Roy should be adjudicated in the revisional jurisdiction.

(b) Whether the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court suffers from illegality or perverseness to make interference.

5. To attend the points raised by Mr. Roy, on verification of the written statement submitted before the learned Trial Court as also observed by learned trial Judge in the order dated 15.7.2003 for Misc Case No. 14 of 1995 for pre-emption I find that the only defence was ventilated as a bargadar in respect of the property sought to be preempted. Learned Trial Judge, in view of that stand of the petitioner, had taken step to obtain report under section 21(3)