The provisions of Section 204 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 do not allow the Corporation authorities to levy advertisement tax for a advertisement set up on a building belonging to the Union of India when such advertisement is visible to the members of the public from a public street or a public place.

Debangsu Basak, J.

The writ petitioners challenge the demand for advertisement tax made by the letter dated March 27, 1996 issued on behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities.

2. The writ petitioners assail the demand notice primarily on three grounds. The first ground of challenge is that, the advertisement in question was within the Eden Gardens ground and since such ground was not a public place and the advertisement in the ground was not visible from a street or a public place, the provisions of Section 204 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 could not be invoked for the purpose of demanding advertisement tax. The second ground of challenge is that, the demand notice under challenge suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and has been issued in the breach of the principles of natural justice. The writ petitioners contend that the basis for the amount claim in the demand notice has not been disclosed. The writ petitioners have not been heard prior to the issuance of the demand notice.

3. The third ground of challenge is that, in view of Article 285 of the Constitution of India and that the Union of India being the owner of the land on which the Eden Gardens ground is situated, the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities cannot levy advertisement tax thereon. In support of such contention reliance is placed on All India Reporter 1957 Calcutta page 431 (Turf Properties Limited v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors.) and 2010 Volume 2 Calcutta High Court Notes page 580 (Calcutta Swimming Club & Anr. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation).

4. In support of the proposition that Eden Gardens is not a public place reliance is placed on All India Reporter 1959 Calcutta 704 (The Corporation of Calcutta & Ors. v. Sarat Chandra Ghatak & Anr.). On behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities it is contended that, Article 285 of the Constitution of India exempts land belonging to the Union of India from taxation.

5. Advertisement set up by the writ petitioners is not a property of the Union of India and, therefore, would not be exempt from taxation by virtue of Article 285 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition as well as the complaint made to the police authorities with regard to the advertisement in question, it is contended on behalf of the Corporation authorities that, the advertisement was on the outer side of the ground from the public street of the Eden Gardens ground and, therefore the provisions of Section 204 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 had been attracted.

6. I have considered the rival contentions of the respective parties and the materials made available on record.

7. The first writ petitioner claims to enjoy a lease of Eden Gardens ground in the city of Kolkata by virtue of a deed of lease dated June 15, 1992. The stadium as well as the premises at the Eden Gardens is owned and controlled by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. The writ petitioners had organised the inaugural ceremony of the Wills World Cup of 1996 on February 11, 1996. Thereafter, a semifinal of the World Cup was held on March 13, 1996. The Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities issued a demand notice dated March 27, 1996 demanding a sum of Rs.51,18,450/- on account of advertisement tax for these two days of the World Cup by invoking the provisions of Section 204 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980.

8. So far as the challenge to the notice dated March 27, 1996 on the ground of arbitrariness and the breach of the principles of natural justice are concerned, I find the demand notice dated March 27, 1996 does not disclose any basis for the quantum of demand made for the two days. No material has been placed before me to substantiate the quantum of the demand made. Therefore, in my view, the demand notice dated March 27, 1996 suffers from the vice of arbitrariness.

9. In course of argument it has been admitted that the first writ petition