The Court held that automatic termination of service for non-disclosure of a criminal case is not justified in every case and that the decision in Avtar Singh v. Union of India applies to cases of non-disclosure of criminal cases by candidates for public employment.

1. The petitioner was selected for recruitment as a constable of Railway Protection Force (hereafter the R.P.F.). It is claimed in the writ petition that after such selection, the petitioner was sent for training to Hyderabad on November 1, 2014, and upon successful completion of training he was directed to report to the office of the Chief Security Commissioner, R.P.F. on June 25, 2015 by an order dated June 18, 2015. Although the petitioner has pleaded that he had duly reported on June 25, 2015 in the office of the Chief Security Commissioner, there is no pleading as to what transpired till August 11, 2015 with regard to his formal induction into the R.P.F. On August 11, 2015, the petitioner received a communication from the Staff Officer attached to the office of the Chief Security Commissioner reading as follows :

“In the Attestation Form dated 24.06.2014 submitted by you, it was declared that you have not ever been prosecuted but on receipt of Police Verification Report it is seen that Dhantala Police case No. 282/07 dated 23.09.2007 U/S 447/448/379/411/427/323/325/307/506/120B/34 IPC was registered against you and Police has submitted Charge Sheet against you vide No. 292/07 dated 27.10.07 U/S 447/448/323/325/506/120B/34 IPC and the case is subjudice in the Ld. Court of ACJM/Ranaghat.

Your above act of not disclosing pending police case in Attestation Form dated 24.06.2014 submitted during Viva-Voce tantamounts to ‘False Declaration’. Hence, in terms of Rule 67.2 of RPF Rules 1987, the competent authority has discharged you from enlistment for the post of Constable in RPF/Eastern Railway vide EN-01/2011 with immediate effect.

In view of the above, you are directed to deposit all the accoutrements issued during course of training to this office immediately.

Please acknowledge the receipt.”

Such order of discharge is assailed by the petitioner by presenting this writ petition dated February 22, 2016.

2. Mr. Majumder, learned advocate representing the petitioner invited the attention of the Bench to the judgment and order dated December 2, 2015, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 3rd Court, Ranaghat, in connection with G.R. Case No. 1333 of 2007 arising out of Dhantala P.S. FIR No. 282/07 dated September 23, 2007 under sections 447/448/379/411/427/323/325/307/506/120B/34 IPC, and contended that the petitioner and the other three accused were acquitted under section 248(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to him, the action of the respondents in not affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing prior to ordering discharge as well as not considering his suitability for the post for which he was selected rendered the same indefensible and that having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2016 (7) JT 300 (Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors.), the impugned order ought to be set aside and the respondents directed to reconsider the desirability of retaining the petitioner in service in accordance with law and in the light of the observations in Avtar Singh (supra).

3. Attention of the Bench was also drawn to a letter dated February 24, 2004, issued by the Under Secretary, Railway Board to the Commanding Officer, 2BN/Railway Protection Special Force, Gorakhpur. Referring to the case of one constable recruit, Shri Bijender Singh Gautam, discharged by an order dated January 28, 2002, it appears that his case being sympathetically considered upon his acquittal in the criminal case, which was suppressed while filling up the attestation form, an order was issued to send him for further training in the next batch subject to his fulfilling other conditions. Mr. Majumder contended that a subsequent acquittal has been considered to be an important factor for reversing an earlier order of discharge from service and that the petitioner may be directed to be accorded similar treatment.

4. Per contra, Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate for the respondents contended that the conduct of the petitioner is such