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2016 Supreme(Cal) 990

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited - Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Another - Respondents
W.P. No. 2206 (W) of 2016
Decided On : 09-08-2016

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Anirban Bose, S. Majumder, Avirup Sarkar
For the Union of India : Kaushik Chanda, Siddhartha Banerjee

Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which requires deposit of the entire award amount within 30 days, is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and does not conflict with the appellate provision under Section 173 of the Act.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 168(3) - CONSTITUTIONALITY - ARTICLE 14 - APPEAL - SECTION 173 - The provision requiring deposit of entire award amount within 30 days under Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not conflict with the appellate provision under Section 173 and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Fact of the Case:

A challenge was raised to the constitutionality of Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, arguing that it prescribes an unreasonable and unjust procedure in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and renders the appellate provision under Section 173 of the Act nugatory.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and does not conflict with the appellate provision under Section 173 of the Act. The purpose of Section 168(3) is to ensure that the award money is not frittered away by illiterate, ignorant, or minor claimants and to cater to their future needs.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. Whether Section 168(3) conflicts with the appellate provision under Section 173 of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 168(3) was incorporated to ensure that the award money is not frittered away by illiterate, ignorant, or minor claimants and to cater to their future needs. 2. Section 168(3) does not operate as an embargo on the appellate remedy, which can be availed upon deposit of the sum as envisaged in the proviso to Section 173(1). 3. The period of limitation for preferring an appeal under Section 173 is independent of the requirement of deposit of the award money within 30 days under Section 168(3).

Final Decision: The writ petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

Joymalya Bagchi, J.

A challenge is thrown to the constitutionality of Section 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the ground that it prescribes an unreasonable and unjust procedure in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and renders the appellate provision under section 173 of the said Act nugatory.

2. Learned lawyer appearing for the petitioner submits that while subsection (3) of Section 168, inter alia, required the judgment-debtor to deposit the award money within thirty days in the manner as the Tribunal may direct, the period of limitation for preferring appeal under Section 173 is ninety days and that too, only upon deposit of Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the award money whichever is less. Hence, he argued that the aforesaid statutory imperative of depositing the entire award money within thirty days renders the appellate provision illusory.

3. He further submitted that taking advantage of the aforesaid provision of law, execution proceedings are promptly instituted and attachment orders are passed to the prejudice of the judgment-debtor whose statutory right of appeal within the period of limitation is thereby rendered nugatory.

4. Accordingly, he submitted that the aforesaid provision is arbitrary, unreasonable and cannot survive the test of reasonableness as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India submitted that the aforesaid provisions may be read harmoniously as they operate in different fields. While sub-section (3) of section 168 merely requires the award sum to be deposited within the timeframe prescribed therein, non-compliance of such legislative imperative dues not affect the appellate remedy provided in the Statute.

6. He further submitted that it is always open to the appellate court, upon the appeal being preferred to pass appropriate order of stay of execution of the award pending hearing of the appeal. Accordingly, sub-section (3) of Section 168 does not affect the appellate powers under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot be said to be either ultra vires the scheme of the Act or the Constitution.

7. I have considered the submissions of the parties. It is not a case of lack of legislative competence on the part of the legislature to enact the impugned provision. However, it has been argued that sub-section (3) of section 168 cannot remain in the statute in the face of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the incorporation of such provision renders the procedure engrafted in the Act arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

8. Adjudication of the aforesaid issue requires examination of the aforesaid provisions which read as follows:-

"Section 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal - (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be :

Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiou






















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