The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of due diligence and good faith in prosecuting proceedings in a wrong forum, and the conditions for the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

I.P. Mukerji, J.

This is an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an award dated 30th September, 2008 passed by a departmental arbitrator of Steel Authority of India Limited, Sri B.M.K. Singh. It was heard on a preliminary objection that it was barred by the laws of limitation.

2. Section 34 (3) of the said Act provides that an application to set aside the award may be made by a party not after three months of the date of receipt of the award. The court, before which such an application is made, has the power to condone delay of 30 days only. Therefore the maximum time period to file this kind of an application is 120 days from the date of receipt of the award by a party. It is now very firmly established that no court has the power to condone delay beyond this period, as this time period has been held to be a special period of limitation, in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Company reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470.

3. In this case the award was made on 30th September, 2008. It was served on the petitioner on 5th October, 2008. On 23rd December, 2008 they filed an application before the learned Sub Judge, Bokaro to set aside the award. On 21st February, 2009 the respondent made an application in that court under Section 42 of the Limitation Act stating that the application did not lie before it, for want of territorial jurisdiction. Nothing happened in that application. Finally, the petitioner applied for withdrawal of their main application on 31st July, 2000. The learned Court allowed its withdrawal on 4th September, 2010 with liberty to file a fresh one on the self-same cause of action in the appropriate court. On 20th September, 2010 the present application was filed in this court.

4. The application to set aside the award was filed in the Bokaro court within seventy eight days of receipt of the award. If this period of time during which the application was pending in that court is not excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the application to set aside the award is hopelessly barred. If it is excluded then the application was filed in this court, on the 94th days of receipt of the award, by adding the 16 days' time taken to file the application in this court on 20th September, 2010 after withdrawal thereof on 4th September, 2010 from Bokaro court. Thus there was a marginal delay of 4 days only.

5. The first question is whether Section 34 (3) of the said Act excludes the operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 14 is in the following terms:

"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.-

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.

Explanati