The main legal point established in the judgment is that a decision of a Stock Exchange refusing to grant in principle approval for delisting is appealable under Section 21A(2) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956.

DEBANGSU BASAK, J.

1. The writ petitioners have challenged the decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange, refusing to grant in principle approval for delisting of the equity shares of the first petitioner, as contained in the writing dated April 21, 2017 issued by the Calcutta Stock Exchange. The writ petitioners have also sought in principle approval for delisting of the equity shares of the first petitioner as made in the application dated October 7, 2016.

2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners has submitted that, the equity shares of the first writ petitioner is listed with the Calcutta Stock Exchange. Such shares are infrequently traded. The first petitioner has decided to delist its equity shares from the Calcutta Stock Exchange. It had applied on October 7, 2016 for such purpose. He has referred to the various correspondence exchanged between the petitioners and the Calcutta Stock Exchange and has submitted that, the petitioners had answered every query raised by the Calcutta Stock Exchange. He has referred to the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009 and submitted that, a stock exchange cannot withhold grant of in principle approval, unfairly. He has submitted that, the Regulations of 2009 notices few grounds for refusal. None of such grounds are attracted in the facts of the present case. Therefore, the Calcutta Stock Exchange should have granted the in principle approval. He has referred to the grounds of refusal as contained in the impugned letter dated April 21, 2017. He has submitted that, such grounds are without any basis. He has contended that, the first petitioner is seeking to delist its equity shares from the Calcutta Stock Exchange. No outsider is acquiring or taking over the first petitioner. The provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 are not attracted. The allegation of non-settlement of investor grievances are without any basis. The only grievance of the investors which can have any legitimacy, if at all, is the non-fixation of the exit price. Exit price is required to be fixed only after the first petitioner receives the in principle approval. Since such approval is still awaited, the sufficiency of such grievance need not be considered at the present moment.

3. Calcutta Stock Exchange is a body which functions under various statutes, rules and regulations governing it. It has to proceed strictly in accordance with such provisions. In the present case, Calcutta Stock Exchange has exceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to act beyond the statute and the regulations governing it. In support of such contentions, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, has relied upon 1988 Volume 1 Calcutta Law Journal page 295 (Ram Nath Mehra & Ors.v. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors.). Relying upon 2003 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases page 107 (Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors.), judgment and order dated July 6, 2017 passed in W.P. No. 487 of 2015 (Jaju Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. The Commissioner of Customs (Port) & Ors.) and the judgment and order dated August 16, 2017 passed in W.P. No. 21465 (W) of 2017 (Balaji Polytex Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. The Union of India & Ors.) he has submitted that, exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. He has submitted that, therefore, the reliefs as sought for by the petitioners be granted.

4. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent has questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. He has submitted that, the petitioners have statutory alternative remedy available. He has referred to various provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 particularly Sections 31, 21A, 23L and 23F of the Act of 1956 in support of his contention that, the impugned order is appea