I.P.MUKERJI
Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
Debdas Routh – Respondent
I.P. MUKERJI, J.
1. In each of the above applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the respondent/respondents have taken the point that this Court is lacking in jurisdiction to determine it. The reason is that in each of the agreements between the parties, the venue of arbitration was specified.
2. It is now settled law that the venue of the arbitration specified in the arbitration agreement means the “seat” of arbitration. “Seat” is associated with English law. If a “venue” is mentioned in addition to the “seat” then it refers to a place for holding the arbitration, other than the venue. (See Shashour Sharma’s Case (2009) 2 Lloyd’s Report 376).
3. By operation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017) 7 SCC 678 only the Court/ Courts in the place of seat have the determination to hear an application under Part-I of the said Act.
4. The relevant passage from the Supreme Court judgment is set out below:-
“19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the pres
A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem
Balco vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552
Hakam Singh vs. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 740
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017) 7 SCC 678
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