SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2017 Supreme(Cal) 809

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
MIR DARA SHEKO, J.
Mithun @ Akhtar Ali – Petitioner
Versus
Sk. Aziz Haque & Ors. - Opposite Parties
C.O. No. 1332 of 2016
Decided On : 24-11-2017

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Somnath Roy Chowdhury
For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Sanjib Seth

The main legal point established is that the statutory obligations of tenants under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 must be fulfilled, and the exercise of judicial discretion does not extend to condoning the tenant's failure to comply with these obligations.

Headnote:

W.B.P.T. Act - Delayed Rent Deposit - Section 7(2) - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, specifically Section 7(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court analyzed the statutory obligations of the tenant to deposit arrears and current rent, the exercise of judicial discretion, and the inapplicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in condoning the delay.

Fact of the Case:

The tenant failed to deposit the current rent after settling arrears, and sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court rejected the application, citing insufficient causes and the tenant's obligation to comply with statutory provisions.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the rejection of the tenant's application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was justified, as the tenant failed to provide sufficient reasons for the delay in rent deposit.

Issues: The issues involved the tenant's plea for condonation of delay, the statutory obligations under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the tenant's failure to comply with statutory obligations did not warrant the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the rejection of the tenant's plea was justified.

Final Decision: The court upheld the lower court's decision, dismissing the tenant's application and ordering the tenant to pay costs.

JUDGMENT :

Mir Dara Sheko, J.

1. The application under Section 7(2) of the W.B.P.T. Act initially was disposed of by Learned Trial Court on March 7, 2014 directing the petitioner herein to deposit the rent fell in arrear up to January 2014 with statutory interest at a time with as usual further direction to go on depositing the sum equivalent to current monthly rent.

2. At the instance of the petitioner/defendant/tenant in an application under Article 227, Constitution of India being C.O. 1612 of 2014 period of default only was modified holding that the petitioner was in default from January 2011 till January 2014 i.e. for 157 months instead of 168 months as erroneously calculated by learned Trial Court, and said amount would have to be deposited by 15th February, 2015.

3. The petitioner contended that though said calculated amount of arrear with statutory interest was deposited by challan on February 7, 2015, but did not take steps in respect of depositing the sum equivalent to the rent for current months till receipt of the certified copy of the disposal order of C.O. 1612 of 2012 lying with his Advocate of High Court.

4. The petitioner on receipt of copy of said order filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in depositing the sum said to be the current rents from February 2014 to January 2015 on 7th February 2015.

5. Learned Trial Court took note of the plea of the petitioner as the petitioner allegedly was under impression that in view of pendency of C.O. 1612 of 2012 he was not required to deposit the current rent from February 2014 onwards. However learned Trial Court rejected the application dated 7.2.2015 filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act holding that the causes shown by the petitioner to condone the delay were insufficient and observed as follows:-

“It is settled principle that ‘ignorance of law’ is not an excuse. It appears from the order sheet that the Defendant has filed hazira during the period of January 2014 till March 2014. Subsequently since April 2014 till November 2014 did not take any steps and ultimately appeared again through a new Advocate on 19.01.15. There is no explanation or sufficient causes in the instant petition as to what deterred the Defendant from filing rent deposit challans for the current period of January 2014 till March 2014 while he took part in hearing of the application U/S 7(2) of W.B.P.T. Act on 09.01.14 till it was disposed on 07.03.14.”

6. Mr. Chowdhury submitted that bona fide conduct of the petitioner should have to be taken into consideration, and protection under Section 7(4) of the Act should be granted by extending time in exercise of judicial discretion as the unintentional default after final settlement took place only once within a period of twelve months.

7. Mr. Chowdhury learned counsel for the petitioner to apprise the Court submitted that application under Section 5 is applicable in condoning the delay to the discretion of the Court in extending time to even the current rents. Mr. Chowdhury relied upon the following cases:-

(a) M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick & Anr. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1010.

(b) Ashok Kumar Bhagnani Vs. Mansur Ahmed reported in 2015(4) CHN (CAL) 699.

(c) Bal Gopal Maheshwari & Ors. Vs. Sanjeev Kumar Gupta, Civil Appeal No. 7279 of 2013 unreported.

8. Mr. Sanjib Seth per contra submitted that applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delayed deposit would not be available under the Act since it is a special statute. Alternatively argued that when the opportunity once was allowed to the petitioner to make payment of delayed deposit by settling the period and amount of default in respect of the rented premises, and, while again the petitioner fell in default for 3 months in succession protection under Section 7(4) would no more be available to the petitioner and defence against delivery of possession would be struck off by operation of law


































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top